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Abstract
A set of policy protocols is developed for marine scientists conducting experiments in
the ocean. These protocols are designed to assist researchers in incorporating public
input into their research without compromising the integrity of the science in this
new era of intense public scrutiny.
The foundation for these protocols is established through an analysis of the rele-
vant national and international legislation and a series of case studies of oceanographic
research. Through this analysis, two major transitions in the political framework of
marine scientific research become apparent: 1) an "internationalization" of oceanog-
raphy in the 1970s, and 2) a "democratization" of oceanography in the 1990s. The
examination of the legislation reveals the origin of these transitions in the evolution
of the national and international political climates that reflect the constant advances
in the understanding of the ocean environment. The case studies provide concrete
examples of research that has been executed within the framework of the transitions:
1) Deep-sea drilling started in the 1950s in the U.S. and became an international
effort in the 1970s because of various external pressures; 2) Acoustic tomography
includes the benchmark example of public scrutiny in marine science and demon-
strates the potential for severe negative consequences if scientists are not prepared
for public involvement; and 3) An experiment in CO 2 sequestration is currently in the
planning stages and provides an opportunity to apply the new policy protocols in an
attempt to incorporate public input while maintaining appropriate scientific methods
and standards.
A condensed version of the policy protocols for marine scientific experimentation
illustrates the basic approach to public involvement:
I Establish a broad support base within the scientific community.
2 Identify stakeholders and engage in appropriate public outreach.
3 Expect inefficiencies and plan accordingly.
4 Conduct research in a transparent fashion throughout all of the phases of
research - planning, implementation, monitoring, and distribution of results.
5) Maintain management flexibility capable of working with change and the
relevant interest groups.
Thesis Supervisor: Judith T. Kildow
Title: Associate Professor, Ocean Policy
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As marine science and policy in the United States have evolved over the past fifty
years, they have become more and more interdependent until they can no longer
be practiced separately. Initially, marine scientists were able to focus solely on the
scientific aspects of their work, interfacing with non-scientists only when seeking
funding. This isolation is no longer the case as outside influences have forced scientists
to interact with policy makers, international agencies and the general public.
In the 1970s, science, including oceanography and marine science, experienced
an internationalization whereby U.S. scientists found that they were expected to
share their knowledge and experience with scientists from other nations. Scientists
were then required to work through their respective governments so that diplomatic
protocols could be observed. Mechanisms of communication and interaction between
scientists and their governments were established to ensure effective collaborations.
In recent years the political framework surrounding science has undergone a new
development. It has become democratized. The public has begun to demand a voice
in the value-laden decisions that can arise through execution of science. If marine
scientists are to effectively operate within this new framework, they must understand
the aspects of their work that have changed and what they can do to utilize the input
of the public while minimizing the potential for negative consequences. More formal
mechanisms of communication and interaction between scientists and the public are
now needed to ensure effective collaborations between these two groups.
The objective of this thesis is to develop policy protocols to assist marine scientists
in incorporating public input throughout their research without compromising the
integrity of the science in this new era of intense public scrutiny. The emphasis is on
experimentation in the oceans, which involves a modification of the ocean environment
in some manner, as this particular form of research is much more likely to encounter
a more stringent public scrutiny. The intense scrutiny is a result of a perception of
increased risks to the public and the marine environment due to the uncertainties
inherent in altering the natural ocean environment.
Because the final product of this thesis is a new set of policy protocols for marine
scientists to consider when facing potential public involvement, a solid foundation for
these protocols is initially established. In developing this foundation, the thesis is
divided into three sections. In the first section the history of the symbiotic develop-
ment of marine science and policy is explored through an analysis of national and
international marine and environmental legislation to demonstrate the dependency
of one upon the other and the evolving nature of their relationship. The legislation
is examined to demonstrate how the responsibilities of researchers have changed over
the past fifty years as knowledge of the ocean system continues to improve and as the
national and international political climates evolve in consideration of this increased
understanding. The second section contains several case studies of oceanographic
research that demonstrate the inevitable outcome of the entwined relationship of the
science and the policy discussed in the first section. The case studies provide concrete
examples of research that has been practiced within the evolving political framework.
A new set of policy protocols is then developed in the third section from the descrip-
tion and analysis of the oceanographic research case studies. These protocols are
intended to guide marine scientists throughout their research so that they are able to
withstand an intense public scrutiny while ensuring that their science is carried out
appropriately.
1.1 The coupling of marine science and policy
The evolution of marine science and policy is explored in Chapter 2 through an
analysis of national and international marine and environmental legislation. The
history of such legislation demonstrates the paradigm shifts in environmental issues
which have dictated the changing objectives of policy makers. As more information
is obtained on the dynamics of the ocean environment, legislation that reflects this
increase in understanding is introduced. As a result, the science and the policy become
more intertwined.
Included in this analysis is a description of national and international legislation
that may be relevant to scientists planning an experiment in the marine environ-
ment. While there are few laws that specifically address the acceptable conduct for
marine researchers, there are many that restrict activities which modify the natural
environment. Much of the relevant legislation involves controls on pollution and/or
contamination. Other significant legislation addresses the issue of potential harm
to marine mammals as well as to other forms of marine life. While many of these
laws may not have originally been designed to prevent scientific research, some ex-
periments may be considered illegal under the provisions of the legislation. Some
legislation, however, takes this into account and allows permits for scientific research
under certain circumstances. Whatever the case, it is in the best interests of marine
scientists to be aware of the relevant legislation and the subsequent restrictions on
their research.
Because the legislation that is passed is not produced in a vacuum, a description of
the events surrounding the introduction and eventual acceptance of the legislation is
also discussed in Chapter 2. The state of the science that exists when the policies are
developed is discussed as well as the societal background within which the science is
practiced. Although a better understanding of the oceans is slowly being developed,
uncertainties prevail. It is the perception of these uncertainties in the context of
society's needs that drives marine policy legislation.
1.2 Case studies
The effects of the interdependent development of oceanography and marine policy
are then examined in Chapters 3-5 through case studies of several experiments in
the ocean environment. The case studies describe experiments in three areas of re-
search: deep-sea drilling, acoustic tomography, and CO 2 sequestration. These three
fields were chosen because individually they contain representative examples of exper-
imental ocean research conducted over the past fifty years that illustrate the various
phases in the development of marine science and policy. Together they demonstrate
the evolution of oceanography, from its relative autonomy in the 1950s, to its inter-
nationalization in the 1970s, to its democratization in the 1990s.
1.2.1 Deep-sea drilling
Deep-sea drilling is a method used by geologists and geophysicists to collect informa-
tion about the dynamic processes of the earth. It promotes basic research into the
history of the ocean basins and the nature of the earth's crust by collecting deep sed-
iment cores from a dynamically-positioned research vessel thousands of meters above
the ocean floor.1
The deep-sea drilling research discussed in Chapter 3 covers more than forty years
of drilling programs and is therefore an excellent example of research that has a long
history in the evolving marine science and policy framework. The history of deep-
sea drilling reveals the relative autonomy of the scientists in the 1950s and 1960s in
addition to the internationalization of the research in the 1970s. Furthermore, current
events suggest that this well-established program is participating in the trend toward
more democratic science by actively seeking means to increase public awareness of its
affairs. 2
The first drilling project discussed is the failed Project Mohole, which was in-
troduced in 1957. The goal of the revolutionary Project Mohole was to drill to the
1JOI, "ODP's Greatest Hits: Contributions from U.S. Scientists," July 1997.
20ODP Review Committee, "The Ocean Drilling Program Mid-term Review," Committee Report,
January 1996.
Mohoroviid discontinuity, the boundary between the earth's outer crust and the up-
per mantle, to determine the composition of the mantle. While initial tests showed
that drilling a single deep core to the necessary depth was technologically feasible,
the project became mired in politics and the expenses became overwhelming. The
project was finally cancelled in 1966.3
The geophysical community, in the meantime, had decided it would be more
cost-effective to collect numerous cores that were less deep throughout the world's
oceans. This led to a more successful drilling program, the Deep Sea Drilling Project
(DSDP), carried out by a consortium of oceanographic research institutions from
1968 to 1983. 4 Deep-sea drilling continues to produce valuable information on the
dynamics of the geophysical processes of the earth through the current Ocean Drilling
Program (ODP).
Although cores have been taken from ocean basins around the world, the DSDP
was initially a project sponsored solely by U.S. government funding agencies. From
1974 to 1976, however, five governments formally joined with the U.S. and the project
entered its International Phase of Drilling. 6 This was done not only to distribute the
costs for the large-scale, expensive project, but also to minimize international pres-
sures on marine scientific research and to satisfy the interests of other countries, eager
to share in the distribution of knowledge.' After the DSDP ended, the current deep-
sea drilling research program, the ODP, began operations. Because these projects
have never faced severe public scrutiny or negative publicity, they have not been
forced to become democratized. It is interesting to note, however, that the principal
scientists are actively seeking public involvement as they push to continue and expand
their research beyond the current 2003 ending date of the ODP.8
3Bates, C.C., T.F. Gaskell, and R.B. Rice, Geophysics in the Affairs of Man: A Personalized
History of Exploration Geophysics and its Allied Sciences of Seismology and Oceanography, Perga-
mon Press, Oxford, 1982, pp. 214-219.
4Baker, D.J., Testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology: Subcommittee
on Science, Research, and Technology. 25 February 1986.
5supra, Note 1.
6 supra, Note 4.
7Nierenberg, W.A., "Deep Sea Drilling - Lessons Learned," Fifth International Congress on the
History of Oceanography, La Jolla, CA, 9 July 1993.
8supra, Note 2.
1.2.2 Acoustic tomography
Ocean acoustic tomography is a relatively new technique that uses sound to measure
average temperatures over large regions of the ocean. Changes in the time it takes
sound to travel between known source and receiver locations are related to changes in
the average temperature between them. Because the ocean is relatively transparent
to sound waves, analysis of travel-time data through inverse methods leads to data
on sound speed. From this the temperature structure between the sound source and
the receiver can be inferred.'
While this technique has been used to monitor temperatures in small seas and
over continental shelves, the acoustic tomographic experiments described in Chap-
ter 4 are basin-scale experiments that have generated controversy over the levels of
sound needed at such large scales. In 1991 a brief feasibility test was carried out by
scientists near a remote island (Heard Island) in the Southern Ocean to determine
whether sound produced near the island could be heard at distances of thousands
of kilometers." This test raised objections from several marine mammal experts as
well as environmental groups, but the experiment was allowed to proceed under the
condition that a marine mammal observation component be added.11
After a successful test, the same scientists then designed the Acoustic Thermom-
etry of Ocean Climate (ATOC) experiment with sound sources located off the coasts
of California and Hawaii to measure temperatures across the Pacific Basin. This ex-
periment is currently in progress and is an expansion of the Heard Island test in that
it will be carried out for a longer duration, includes two sound sources, and attempts
to determine whether accurate measurements of temperature can be made using this
technique. Because of the location of the sound sources and the uncertainties in the
effects of loud, low-frequency sound on marine mammals, an overwhelmingly negative
9 Pickard, G.L., and W.J. Emery, Descriptive Physical Oceanography: An Introduction, 5th (SI)
ed., Permagon Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 123.
10 Munk, W. and A. Baggeroer. "The Heard Island papers: A contribution to global acoustics,"
J. Acoust. Soc. Am., 96(4), 1994, pp. 2327-2329.
"
1 Cohen, J., "Was underwater 'shot' harmful to the whales?" Science, 252, 17 May 1991, pp. 912-
914.
public response was generated. The fact that the scientists were completely unpre-
pared for the public's response only served to exacerbate the situation. In the end, the
design of the experiment was completely revised and the original scientists no longer
have control over the sound transmission schedule in their own research program. A
Marine Mammal Research Program has been added which actually determines the
schedule of transmissions in addition to making the decisions regarding operations,
suspension, and termination of the sound source. 12
Acoustic tomography was chosen as the second area of research to explore because
it includes the benchmark example of the democratization of oceanography. ATOC
was the first oceanographic experiment to come under the intense public scrutiny that
is occurring more and more frequently in science and, unfortunately, these scientists
were not prepared. This case study is used as an example of the potential for negative
consequences if scientists are not aware of the increased scrutiny to which their work
is exposed.
1.2.3 CO 2 sequestration
The ocean storage of captured CO 2 at depth is considered to be an acceleration of
the natural transfer of atmospheric CO 2 into the deep ocean, and therefore a possible
mechanism for greenhouse gas mitigation. The eventual fate of the injected C0 2,
however, is unknown, and researchers from around the world are working to develop
a better understanding of the complex chemical, biological, and oceanographic factors
that is needed before large-scale sequestration of CO 2 can be undertaken. 13
Plans are currently underway for an experiment off the coast of Hawaii involving
the injection of CO 2 into the ocean at a depth of 700-1000 m.14 The results from
this experiment will be combined with ocean circulation models and other tracer
12 Kineon, F.P. "Acoustic Thermometry of Ocean Climate: A case study in the effect of political
pressures on science," Master's thesis, U. of Washington, 15 March 1996.
13"Ocean Storage of CO2: Workshop 2 - Ocean Circulation", IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Pro-
gramme, Cheltenham, UK, January 1996, p. 3.
14Adams, E.E., Senior Research Engineer, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
MIT, Cambridge, MA, Personal communication, May 1998.
experiments to help reduce the uncertainties related to the concept of deep ocean
storage of CO 2 . Because the injection of CO 2 into the deep ocean involves high levels
of uncertainty and will be carried out in coastal waters, the experiment has a strong
possibility of generating emotionally charged controversy. In addition, the fact that
the international environmental community is stressing a reduction of CO 2 emissions
instead of finding mechanisms to mitigate the increasing amount of emissions15 will
inevitably complicate matters further.
The CO 2 sequestration project is currently in the planning stages and does not
have the amount of data the previous case studies have. Instead, this experiment is
being examined in Chapter 5 because the principal scientists are working to establish
an effective public outreach component to their research so that public participation
may be conducted in a constructive manner. It has been chosen as a case study
because it represents the change in awareness of some scientists toward the possibility
of public involvement in their research. In addition, because the CO 2 sequestration
experiment is still in the planning stages, it is a candidate for the application of the
policy protocols developed in this thesis.
1.3 Policy protocol development
Chapter 6 is the logical outcome of the previous chapters. In examining the evolution
of oceanography and examples of past and current research, it becomes apparent that
the current political climate is different from any faced by marine scientists in the
past. The recent development of public participation and influence in environmental
issues has led to the necessity of scientists being prepared to effectively interact with
the public, something they are not trained to do.
In analyzing each of the above case studies, the particulars that have allowed
the scientists to successfully maintain appropriate control over their experiments will
become better defined. The protocols developed in the final chapter will be based on
those mechanisms that were used successfully or could have been used to improve the
151992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
chances of success in the each of the experiments.
The policy protocols developed here cover all phases of potential research projects,
from the planning and implementation stages through to the monitoring and distribu-
tion of results. They will help to guide the scientists in establishing and maintaining
the public trust that is essential in any public process. A successful project will
invite public scrutiny and incorporate public participation throughout the entire re-
search project while still maintaining appropriate scientific methods and standards.
Through the utilization of the new set of policy protocols, scientists should be able
to incorporate public input while maintaining the integrity of their research.
Chapter 2
The Evolution of Marine Policy
and Legislation
This chapter examines the evolving influence of marine policy and legislation on
marine scientific research. The development of U.S. and international environmental
protection legislation and the context under which it was drafted is initially discussed
with an emphasis on the marine environment. An analysis of this development reveals
the increasing value placed on the environment, and the ocean in particular, by the
public and policy-makers. The changing paradigms under which policy-makers have
operated have determined the objectives of marine legislation. The gradual transition
from the concept of tradional freedom and sovereignty as the basis of the law of the
sea to that of the heritage of humankind in concert with a better understanding of
the limits on the assimilative capacity of the oceans has led to the development of an
extensive body of legislation designed to protect the marine environment.
This general discussion is followed by a synopsis of the specific legislation that has
the potential to affect marine scientific research. There is relatively little legislation
that deals explicitly with marine scientific research and the responsibilities of the
scientists. Most of the laws discussed below, therefore, are those that establish limits
on the use of the ocean. In addition to general environmental protection legislation,
other relevant legislation includes controls on pollution and/or contamination in the
marine environment or addresses the issue of potential harm to marine organisms.
Although most of this legislation was not originally intended to restrict scientific re-
search, specific experiments may fall under their jurisdiction due to the nature of
the research." Some legislation, however, takes this unintentional consequence into
account and allows exceptions for scientific research under certain circumstances. If
scientists responsible for planning and implementing ocean research and experimen-
tation are unaware of such legal and political implications, they risk complications
and delays that could jeopardize the success of their projects.
In the early stages of the development of environmental law, and the law of marine
pollution in particular, it was recognized that action should be taken on three levels:
global, regional and national." The regional level of legislation is beyond the scope of
this study, so the focus will be on the development of U.S. and global marine environ-
mental legislation. These two categories will be further broken down into regulations
governing general environmental legislation, marine scientific research, controls on
pollution/contamination, and species protection where appropriate. In addition to
these regulatory categories, a final section covering the recent development of legisla-
tion promoting public participation is also included as such puclic participation will
also be shown to have the potential to directly affect marine scientific research.
2.1 The evolution of U.S. marine environmental
legislation
Before the 1940s, most U.S. marine-related legislation dealt with navigation, trans-
portation, and fisheries issues. Marine pollution laws were passed (1899 Rivers and
Harbors Act), but the intent was primarily to keep navigable waters clear from obsta-
cles to protect commerce. Scientists were relatively free to conduct research wherever
and on whatever they wanted. It was not until the middle of the twentieth cen-
16It should be noted that a specific segment of legislation has been intentionally left out of this
discussion. The substantial number of laws regulating oil pollution have not been included, but
should be considered if the intentional dumping of oil is a component of a marine experiment.
17 Timagenis, G.J., International Control of Marine Pollution, Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs
Ferry, NY, 1980, pp. 39-40.
tury that the inherent value of the oceans themselves began to be recognized among
policy-makers as well as the public.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, several events and the conditions of major bodies
of water combined to bring the health of the environment, specifically the nation's
waters, to the forefront of the public's attentions. In 1969 the Cuyahoga River in
Ohio burst into flames and a major oil spill occurred off the coast of Santa Barbara,
California. Boston Harbor and the Potomac River had both become cesspools and
Lake Erie was declared dead. In response to these and other situations, Congress
passed several significant statutes in the 1970s to establish a broad national framework
for protecting the environment.
2.1.1 General environmental legislation
Two major federal agencies were created in 1970 to promulgate regulations that would
ensure a consistent approach to environmental standards. In July of 1970, the White
House and Congress worked together to establish the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in response to the growing public demand for cleaner water, air, and
land. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was also es-
tablished in 1970 by President Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 4 of July 9, 1970
(84 Stat. 2090) in which many science agencies with related missions were brought
together in one agency.
In addition to creating federal agencies, Congress passed several statutes that
promoted environmental protection. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
was one of the first national level environmental protection laws ever written. NEPA's
basic policy is to assure that all branches of government give proper consideration
to the environment prior to undertaking any major federal action that significantly
affects the environment. s NEPA is the basic U.S. charter for the protection of the
environment. The very premise of NEPA's policy goals is to avoid, minimize, or
compensate for adverse environmental impacts before an action is taken.
1842 U.S.C. §4332(C).
2.1.2 Marine pollution/contamination
Other laws were specifically written to ensure the quality of the nation's waters and
may restrict the types or amounts of foreign substances that scientists are allowed
to inject into the water. As seen in the summary of the pollution regulations found
below, most pollution prevention laws do establish a permitting process that specifies
what intentional pollution may be carried out. It is within the framework of these
general permits that marine scientists must be able to fit their research as exceptions
are not made in favor of scientific research as they are with other permitting processes.
The Federal Government had initially promoted environmental pollution controls
at the state level. The 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act offered state and
local governments technical assistance and funds to promote efforts to protect wa-
ter quality. The 1965 Water Quality Act charged states with setting water quality
standards for interstate navigable waters. This fragmented approach at environmen-
tal protection slowly changed as a better understanding of the unbounded nature of
aquatic systems developed and as the environment was beginning to be viewed as one
complex system as opposed to many unconnected units.
The intent of the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Prevention
and Control Act was to restore and maintain the integrity of the nation's waters
and the Amendments did so by authorizing water quality and pollution research,
providing grants for sewage treatment facilities, setting pollution discharge and water
quality standards, addressing oil and hazardous substances liability, and establishing
permit programs for water quality, point source pollutant discharges, ocean pollution
discharges, and dredging or filling of wetlands. 19 This landmark legislation not only
strengthened the existing water quality standards, but also established a framework
of standards, technical tools and financial assistance to counter the many causes of
water pollution. It is the primary federal law that protects the health of the U.S.
aquatic environments and is enforced by the EPA. Individual states are authorized
under the Act to establish their own standards, as long as such standards are at least
1933 U.S.C. §1251-1387.
as stringent as those mandated by the EPA.
The U.S. had also become concerned about the disposal of wastes at sea by this
time as well. The first major systematic study of the problems posed by dumping at
sea was issued by the U.S. Council of Environmental Quality in October 1970. The
conclusion of the report was that although ocean dumping was not a major source
of pollution at that time, there was a need for urgent action at both the national
and international levels to prevent the problem from growing to a great magnitude. 20
As a result, the Ocean Dumping Act was passed in 1972. It prevented unacceptable
dumping in the oceans.
As more information became available on the chemical and physical properties of
the ocean environment, the legislation of the early 1970s was amended to strengthen
the existing regulations and to include newly discovered contaminants. The 1977
Clean Water Act Amendments, for example, strengthened controls on toxic pollu-
tants.
2.1.3 Species protection
In addition to the trend toward regulating the introduction by man of substances into
the marine environment that may cause deleterious effects, the 1970s also witnessed
the creation of legislation protecting marine organisms for the first time. 21 Like the
marine pollution legislation, these regulations will prevent marine scientists from dis-
turbing the marine environment unchecked, but do provide exemptions. In fact, this
particular type of legislation accounted for the necessity of scientific research to harm
marine organisms on occasion and established specific permit processes especially for
scientific research.
Prior to the passage of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972, indi-
vidual states were responsible for the marine mammals on the land and in the waters
under their jurisdiction. The MMPA vested marine mammal management authority
20 supra, Note 17, pp. 171-172.
21The extensive legislation on the management of fisheries and fish stock is not included in this
discussion as this type of marine life was recognized as a valuable economic resource as early as 1871
when Congress established the U.S. Commission of Fish and Fisheries.
in the Federal Government. In striving to maintain marine mammal populations at
sustainable levels, the MMPA established a moratorium, with certain exceptions, on
the taking of marine mammals in U.S. waters or on the high seas by U.S. citizens.22
It also banned the importation of marine mammals or their products into the United
States.23 The Endangered Species Act (ESA) was enacted in 1973 to mitigate the
impact of human activity on species in danger of extinction. Affected species are
either considered endangered, those species in danger of becoming extinct. 24 Both of
these Acts have the potential to limit marine research, especially when uncertainties
over the degree of potential harm are prevalent.
2.1.4 Public participation in environmental protection
After having established a national legislative framework, the Federal Government has
begun to allow states to assume responsibility for federal programs while still retaining
oversight authority. In addition to broadening the responsibility of environmental
protection to a regional scale, an emphasis has recently been put on incorporating
public participation.
An example of such a restructuring is within the EPA. The current EPA mission
statement includes providing the best customer service possible. The approach to
this goal is based on three principles: 1) encouraging public participation, 2) provid-
ing access to information, and 3) responding to the customer's needs. 25 In order to
accomplish its mission, the EPA is working in partnerships with states, local com-
munities, tribal governments, industry and environmentalists to implement the many
environmental protection laws that Congress has passed. The new generation of
environmental protection is considered to be community-based and is a goal-driven,
rather than program-driven, approach to restoring and sustaining healthy human and
ecological communities. 26
2216 U.S.C. §1371(a).
23Ibid.
2416 U.S.C. §1531(b).
25USEPA, "Putting Customers First: EPA's Customer Service Plan," EPA 230-B-95-004, Septem-
ber 1995.
26 USEPA, "Employment Information," EPA Office of Human Resources and Organi-
Marine scientific research must now be considered within this new public-participation
framework. The effects of this expansion of responsibilities is not yet clear and the
roles of the scientists and the public are still developing.
2.2 The evolution of global marine environmental
legislation
The international community closely followed the developments of the United States
and much of the current environmental legislation is drafted at an international level.
As a result, many of the principles of international environmental law serve either
as guidelines for national level policy or as substitutes for national policy when their
equivalents do not exist. The global rules promote a universal uniformity of norms
whereas national legislation is used for the purpose of supplementing and giving effect
to international rules.27
2.2.1 General environmental legislation
Because of the tendency to address very specific problems in international legislation,
there are no relevant conventions that govern the general health of the environment.
There are, however, several relevant principles of international environmental law
that are at the foundation of much of the international environmental policy. These
principles are reflected in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:
* Precautionary Principle - Where there are threats of serious or irreversible dam-
age, the lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for post-
poning cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
* Principle of Good Neighbourliness - States should effectively cooperate to dis-
courage or prevent the relocation and transfer to other States of any activities
zational Services: Office of Administration and Resources Management, (available at
http://www.epa.gov/epahrist/, April 1998).
27 supra, Note 17, p. 41.
and substances that cause severe environmental degradation or are found to be
harmful to human health.
* Principle of Good Governance, including Participatory Democracy - Environ-
mental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens,
at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appro-
priate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public
authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their
communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes.
States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by mak-
ing information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative
proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.
* Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Responsibility not to
cause Environmental Damage - Nations have the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. 28
These principles are the product of the general trend over the years toward a
more protective approach to the environment. They are the skeleton upon which
most national legislation is based and must be kept in mind by marine researchers as
the principles define the current attitude toward the responsibilities of nations, and
therefore of individuals, to the environment.
2.2.2 Marine scientific research
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the one
piece of legislation that specifically outlines rules for marine scientific research and
28 "Rio Declaration on Environment and Development," The United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3-14 June 1992.
the responsibilities of both the coastal states as well as the researchers. In general,
this Convention represents the codification of customary law. In addition, it sets the
standard for potential uses of the world's oceans and affects the drafting of national
legislation even in countries where it has not been ratified.
Marine scientific research discussions prior to the finalization of the 1982 Conven-
tion focused on the potential impact the Convention would have on the scope, nature,
and location of worldwide marine scientific research activities. 29 Prior to the imple-
mentation and ratification of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf in 1964,
coastal state restrictions on oceanographic research conducted beyond territorial sea
limits were virtually unknown. After 1964, however, claims to greater coastal state
control began to afffect many research activities. 30 The problem was not only an in-
creased number of coastal state refusals. Many oceanographic projects were delayed
due to lengthy time-consuming procedures often required to obtain permission and
others were abandoned or indefinitely postponed as a result of such actions.31 While
the financial losses incurred by such delays and refusals were enormous, the scientific
community was more distressed by the scientific losses as many of the most complex
and important problems are found in coastal areas and seldom correspond to political
boundaries. 32
The 1982 UNCLOS resolved many of the uncertainties in coastal state consent
procedures and established a framework for the conduct of marine scientific research.
Part XIII of the Convention, Marine Scientific Research, confirms that all states
and international organizations have the right to conduct marine scientific research,
subject to the provisions of UNCLOS. It also creates obligations for states to cooperate
in the scientific research field. It creates a relatively flexible working environment
for marine scientists within the high seas and grants most of the decision making
authority to the discretion of the coastal states for work in jurisdictional waters
29National Academy of Sciences, "Marine Scientific Research and the Third Law of the Sea Con-
ference," U.S. National SCOR Committee report, Washington, D.C., 1974, p. 1.
30 supra, Note 29, p. 2.
31Ibid.
32 supra, Note 29, p. 3.
while providing guidelines for a consistent permitting process.33 While specifically
addressing the rights of researchers, marine scientific research is still set within the
context of the overall goals of the Convention and is constrained by the potential it
has to affect the marine environment. (The UNCLOS approach to the protection and
preservation of the marine environment is discussed further in the following section.)
2.2.3 Marine pollution/contamination
The sea has been traditionally used by man as a site for the disposal of wastes. 34
According to Grotius, the oceans could be used as a dumping ground because it did
not appear to interfere with other uses of the oceans.35 This attitude has slowly
changed over the past forty years.
International concern with marine pollution first took a practical form in the
1950s and resulted in multilateral international conventions specifically addressing
this problem. Until the early 1970s, the concern was basically limited to oil pollution.
Conventions on nuclear ships and nuclear damage treated the matter as a dangerous
activity rather than an environmental isssue.3 6 The 1970s, however, saw a dramatic
increase in the number of conventions with principal environmental objectives that
were not just limited to oil or radioactive pollution. These conventions took place
during, and were influenced by, the preparation of and the negotiations in the Third
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. 37
The UN Conference on the Human Environment took place in Stockholm in June
1972. This conference did not adopt a treaty, but did give concrete form to the existing
concern for the environment and provided the motive force for further action.38 The
defintion of marine pollution developed for this conference connects the concept of
331982 UNCLOS, Articles 245-246.
34supra, Note 17, p. 109.
35Van Dyke, J.M.,"International Governance and Stewardship of the High Seas and Its Re-
sources", Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century: Governance and Environmental Harmony, Van
Dyke, J.M., D. Zaelke and G. Hewison, eds., Island Press, Washington, D.C., p. 16.
36 supra, Note 17, p. 4.
37 supra, Note 17, p. 9.
38 supra, Note 17, p. 10.
marine pollution to a human activity causing certain undesirable results to the marine
environment and has become the basis for all subsequent definitions. The Conference
defined marine pollution as:
The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy
into the marine environment (including estuaries) resulting in such dele-
terious effects as harm to living resources, hazards to human health, hin-
drance to marine activities, including fishing, impairment of quality or use
of sea water, and reduction of amenities. 39
Conventions on marine pollution adopted prior to 1972 do not include any def-
inition of marine pollution since they relate to specific types of harm or danger to
the environment. Legal texts adopted from 1972 to 1974 use this definition implicitly
in the basic obligation for the protection of the marine environment. Legal texts
prepared from 1974 onwards, however, include an express definition of the term "ma-
rine pollution." 40 The conclusion can therefore be drawn from the development of
the definition of pollution, that the international law of the sea transitioned to an
environmentally stronger regime throughout the 1970s.41
Several factors contributed to the focused attention on marine pollution during
this period. Increased ocean disposal of industrial wastes, off-shore exploitation of
hydrocarbons, and deep-sea mining revealed new sources of marine pollution. The
rapid growth of tanker tonnage and a number of accidents with disastrous pollution
results also gave the international community opportunities to appreciate the existing
and approaching dangers from pollution. Economic conditions also increased the
importance of marine resources at the same time developments in fishing technologies
and marine pollution combined to create severe risks of deterioration or destruction
to those resources. 42
Pursuant to the Stockholm conference, an international conference was convened
from October 30 to November 13, 1972 and adopted the Convention on the Prevention
39supra, Note 17, p. 23.
40supra, Note 17, pp. 23-24.
4 1supra, Note 17, p. 25.
42supra, Note 17, pp. 33-34.
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter (London Convention on
Dumping), the first convention to address ocean dumping at a global scale.4 3
One of the most influential international conventions on environmental protection
in the ocean, the 1982 UNCLOS, was then based on the preceeding work. Discussions
leading to the framing of this Convention in the 1970s made it clear that the global
community recognized the need for international standards to be established with
respect to the multiple uses of the ocean and its resources.
2.3 Legislation affecting marine scientific research
What follows is a description of national and international legislation that may be
relevant to marine scientific research.44 Because the emphasis is on experimentation
in the marine environment, the legislation described below was chosen for its poten-
tial impact on this type of marine scientific research. While there are few laws that
specifically address the acceptable conduct for marine researchers, there are many
that restrict activities which modify the natural environment. In addition to gen-
eral environmental protection legislation, other relevant legislation involves controls
on pollution and/or contamination in the marine environment and marine species
protection. While the following is not an exhaustive list of the potentially relevant
legislation, it effectively summarizes the current policy of the U.S. and the interna-
tional community toward the use of the oceans. 45
2.3.1 General environmental legislation
While most of the legislation that may apply to experimentation in the oceans specif-
ically addresses marine environmental concerns, there is important general national
environmental legislation to consider as well.
43 supra, Note 17, p. 11.
44A chronological list of the legislation may be found in Appendix A.
45When operating in coastal waters, scientists must be aware of local regulations as states and
other nations may have enacted standards that are more stringent than the internationally recognized
limits.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §4321-4370
Because of its comprehensive coverage over environmental issues and its strict require-
ments, NEPA is of primary importance. NEPA was passed by Congress to ensure
that any government sponsored project or action take into account and assess the po-
tential environmental impact of the project. NEPA requires that "all agencies of the
Federal Government shall ... include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.""46
Thus, NEPA requires an extensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) from re-
searchers proposing to significantly modify the natural environment. The environ-
mental impact assessments are then evaluated for their conformity to the objectives
of appropriate agency regulations propagated under such legislation as the Marine,
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act or the Clean Water Act.
Of relevance to this discussion are two other NEPA requirements that address
the possibility of controversial propositions. First, NEPA requires agencies to use a
systematic, interdisciplinary approach to all planning and decision-making so that the
uncertainty inherent in environmental assessments is mitigated and all environmental
4642 U.S.C. §4332(C).
resources may be given appropriate consideration. 47 In addition, NEPA specifies
requirements for publishing the proposed action in the Federal Register so that the
public may comment and request special hearings.48 All such public comments must
then be responded to in the EIS as required by NEPA.
2.3.2 Regulations addressing marine scientific research
While much of the national level environmental legislation includes provisions to
promote research in general, few laws actually provide any guidance as to what con-
stitutes appropriate marine scientific research. The Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972 is an exception.
At the international level, the key legislation is the 1982 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea. This major Convention is unique in that it specifically
addresses marine scientific research and provides guidelines for the conduct of re-
search, especially within the international community.
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§1441-1445
Title III of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) autho-
rizes the designation of discrete areas of the marine environment as National Marine
Sanctuaries to protect distinctive natural and cultural resources whose protection
and beneficial use requires comprehensive planning and management. The Act also
established the National Marine Sanctuary Program (NMSP), which is administered
by the Sanctuaries and Reserves Division of NOAA.4 9
The mission of the NMSP is to identify, designate and manage areas of the marine
environment of special national significance due to their conservation, recreational,
ecological, historical, research, educational, or aesthetic qualities. The goals of the
4742 U.S.C. §4332(A).
4842 U.S.C. §4332(C), 5 U.S.C. §552.
49NOAA,"National Marine Sanctuary Program Mission," Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource
Management, NMSP, (available at http://wave.nos.noaa.gov/ocrm/nmsp/welcome.html, May 1998).
NMSP are to provide enhanced resource protection through conservation and manage-
ment of the Sanctuaries that complements existing regulatory authorities; to support,
promote, and coordinate scientific research on, and monitoring of, the site-specific
marine resources of the Sanctuaries; to enhance public awareness, understanding, ap-
preciation, and wise use of the marine environment; and to facilitate, to the extent
compatible with the primary objective of resource protection, multiple uses of the
National Marine Sanctuaries.50
Like similar environmental legislation, Title III of the MPRSA promotes scien-
tific research. Because of the specific objectives of the MPRSA, however, there are
very precise limits on the types of research that may be conducted within the juris-
diction of the MPRSA. Since the general mission of the MPRSA is to promote the
preservation of the National Marine Sanctuaries, it is unlikely that experiments that
may significantly modify the natural environment will be permitted to be conducted
within a sanctuary.
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Part XIII
The 1982 UNCLOS specifically outlines rules for marine scientific research. In addi-
tion to very specific provisions as to the responsibilities of the coastal states as well
as the scientists, UNCLOS also provides general principles for the conduct of marine
scientific research:
(a) marine scientific research shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes;
(b) marine scientific research shall be conducted with appropriate scientific methods
and means compatible with this Convention;
(c) marine scientific research shall not unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate
uses of the sea compatible with this Convention and shall be duly respected in
the course of such uses;
50Ibid.
(d) marine scientific research shall be conducted in compliance with all relevant
regulations adopted in conformity with this Convention including those for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment. 1
Once again, research is constrained by the potential it has to affect the marine envi-
ronment. (The UNCLOS provisions on the protection and preservation of the marine
environment are discussed in the following section.)
2.3.3 Marine pollution/contamination legislation
The regulatory structure of the U.S. concerning ocean dumping is similar to that of
the international structure. Most highly toxic materials are prohibited from being
dumped and all other materials are subject to the process of permit applications
reviewed by the appropriate regional administrator of the EPA.52
1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §1251-1387
The Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act specifically protects wet-
lands and other aquatic habitats through a permitting process that ensures activities
are conducted in an environmentally sound manner. It is unlawful for any person
to discharge any pollutant from a point source into navigable waters under the Act
unless a permit is obtained. The permits specify:
* the amount and concentration of pollutants the holder is authorized to dis-
charge,
* schedules directing when compliance must be achieved,
* the requirements for testing, and monthly or quarterly reporting to the permit-
ting authority.53
511982 UNCLOS, Article 240.
52Auerbach, D.I., J.T. Kildow, H.J. Herzog, and E.E. Adams, "Legal and Political Aspects of CO 2
Ocean Disposal," Environmental Impacts of Ocean Disposal of C0 2 : Volume 2 - Topical Reports,
MIT Energy Laboratory Report 96-003, December 1996.
5333 U.S.C. §1342.
Permits may therefore be obtained for marine scientific research, but are not guaran-
teed. Exceptions are not explicitly made for scientific research, so scientists receive
no special consideration under this Act.
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§1441-1445
Not only does the MPRSA cover sanctuaries, Title II of the MPRSA (the Ocean
Dumping Act) prohibits unacceptable dumping in the ocean. Congress declared that
"it is the policy of the United States to regulate the dumping of all types of materials
into ocean waters and to prevent or strictly limit the dumping into ocean waters of
any material which would adversely affect human health, welfare, or amenities, or the
marine environment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities."5 4
Permits are also granted under the Ocean Dumping Act and are similar in their to
those of the Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act permits in that they
specify when and what dumping may occur. 55 Permits are granted only after the EPA
"gives notice and opportunity for public hearings" and "determines that such dumping
will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare, or amenities, or the
marine environment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities." 56 Consideration
may be given to the need for the proposed dumping,5 7 but there is no specific category
for marine scientific research.
1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and other Matter
This Convention, commonly known as the London Dumping Convention (LDC), is the
most restrictive regulation framework governing dumping from ships. The definition
of ocean dumping is "i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other mater from
vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea. ii) any deliberate
5433 U.S.C. §1401(b).
5533 U.S.C. 1414(a).
5633 U.S.C. §1412(a).
5733 U.S.C. §1412(a)(A).
disposal at sea of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea.""5
The Convention separates potential pollutants based on the danger to the en-
vironment presented by the materials into three classes called annexes. Annex I
materials are considered to be extremely dangerous substances (organohalogen com-
pounds, mercury, cadmium, oil, plastics, high-level radioactive wastes, and materials
of chemical warfare) and are completely prohibited from being dumped at sea except
in trace amounts that would be "rapidly rendered harmless by physical, chemical or
biological process in the sea." 5 9
Dumping of materials in Annex II (wastes containing significant amounts of ar-
senic, lead, copper, zinc cyanides, fluorides, beryllium, chromium, nickel, vanadium,
other radioactive wastes not included in Annex I, and large quantities of acids or
alkalis containing any of the above metals) require a special permit issued by the
State. Annex III includes all other matter or wastes, which require a general permit
in order to dump.60 The Annexes are continuously updated to reflect changes in the
understanding of the ocean environment as well as the introduction of new chemical
species to the international community. This Convention will obviously affect scien-
tific research that involves the injection of substances covered under the annexes from
ship-based sources, if only by requiring permits to be obtained.
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Part XII
The most advanced definition of marine pollution in the course of the development
of the concept is the one put forward by UNCLOS. It defines marine pollution to be:
The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy
into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely
to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine
life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including
fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use
581982 LDC, Article 3.
59LDC, Article 4 and Annex I.
6 oLDC, Article 4.
of sea water and reduction of amenities.61
This definition is an expansion on the basic elements of the original one formulated
for the UN Conference on the Human Environment discussed above.
Part XII of the Convention, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environ-
ment, submits that "State have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment." 62 It goes on to establish measures to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment. 63 The reference to the necessity to protect the
marine environment in Part XIII of the Convention makes it clear that marine science
research does not outweigh the provisions established here and that any experiment
that proposes to inject alien substances into the ocean that have the potential to
cause harm will be subject to this Act.
2.3.4 Species protection legislation
Any experimentation that may affect marine biota may come under two very stringent
U.S. species protection laws, the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered
Species Act. The relevant objective of these laws is the protection of marine species
from man's activities. 64 Both offer waivers for scientific research, but the permitting
process can be very political.
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §1361-1421
In striving to maintain marine mammal populations at sustainable levels, the MMPA
established a moratorium, with certain exceptions, on the taking of marine mammals
in U.S. waters or on the high seas by U.S. citizens. 65 It also banned the importation
of marine mammals or their products into the United States.66 The term "take" is
defined to mean "to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture,
611992 UNCLOS, Article 1(1)(4).
621982 UNCLOS, Article 192.
631982 UNCLOS, Article 194.
64Note that the ESA also provides protection for land based species.
6516 U.S.C. §1371(a).
66 Ibid.
or kill any marine mammal.""'7 Because of the broad definition used, many research
projects may unintentionally warrant additional scrutiny under the MMPA. Although
permits may be issued for public display and scientific research,6" the permits are
very specific in the numbers and species of animal that can be taken, as well as times,
dates, places, and methods of taking.69 In addition, before a permit is granted for the
proposed taking or importation, the proposal is first reviewed by the Marine Mammal
Commission and the Committee of Scientific Advisors on Marine Mammals. 70
Under the MMPA Amendments of 1994, a definition of harassment was added to
the Act differentiating between Level A, which has the potential to injure a marine
mammal or stock, and Level B, which has the potential to disturb but not injure a
marine mammal or stock. The permit requirement may now be waived provided that
the proposed activity results in only harassment, and no serious injury or mortality
is anticipated. The Amendments also require the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) in the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) in the Department of the Interior to promulgate regulations authorizing bona
fide scientific research involving only Level B harassment without a formal permit.
To get the permit requirement waived, specified information must be submitted to
NMFS or FWS at least 60 days prior to beginning research. Also, expedited scientific
research permits will now be allowed when delay could cause injury to a marine
mammal or loss of unique research opportunities. 71
Prior to the passage of the MMPA, individual states were responsible for the ma-
rine mammals on the land and in the waters under their jurisdiction. The MMPA
vested marine mammal management authority in the Federal Government. States can
regain their authority on a species-by-species basis if their conservation and manage-
ment programs are found to be consistent with the purposes and policies of the Act.72
6716 U.S.C. §1362(13).
6816 U.S.C. §1371(a)(1).
6916 U.S.C. §1374(b)(2).
7016 U.S.C. §1371(a)(1).
71Buck, E.H., "Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1994," CRS Report for Congress,
94-751 ENR, 28 September 1994.
7216 U.S.C. §1379.
Care must be taken, therefore, to ensure that state regulations are also complied with
when permits for research that may affect localized biota are being considered.
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §1531-1544
The ESA was enacted to mitigate the impact of human activity on species in danger
of extinction. Affected species are either considered endangered, those species in
danger of becoming extinct throughout all or a significant portion of their range, or
threatened, those species likely to become endangered within the near future. Anyone
may petition to have a species considered for listing as endangered or threatened,
and once approved for the list, a species and its habitat become protected under the
ESA. The FWS is responsible for terrestrial and freshwater species. The NMFS is
responsible for marine species and Pacific salmon.
As under the MMPA, proposed research projects that could potentially affect
species covered under this Act are subject to a detailed review. Projects which
include destruction of areas designated as critical habitats are also subject to this
review. Federal action agencies are prohibited from taking any action which might
threaten a listed species under the ESA unless a special waiver has been issued. Non-
federal activities which may affect listed species are also covered under the Act and
may also be issued permits by the NMFS for incidental take when it occurs under
scientific purposes. Applications for waivers must include a conservation plan that
specifies:
(i) the impact which will likely result from such taking;
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts, and
the funding that will be available to implement such steps;
(iii) what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered and the reasons
why such alternatives are not being utilized; and
(iv) such other measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or ap-
propriate for purposes of the plan. 3
Again the agency must provide an opportunity for public comment7" before granting
any waivers.
7335 U.S.C. §1539(2)(A).
7435 U.S.C. §1539(2)(B).
Chapter 3
Deep-Sea Drilling
The evolution of oceanography and marine policy will now be examined through sev-
eral case studies of oceanographic research. These examples of marine scientific re-
search describe experimentation in the ocean because they actually modify the ocean
environment to some degree and do not just take measurements of oceanographic
properties. As will be seen, this subtle difference will have a substantial influence
on the external public pressures on the research. The case studies have been chosen
as examples of experimental oceanographic research that demonstrate the transitions
of internationalization and democratization in the evolution and marriage of marine
science and policy processes during the last half of this century. Each experiment
illustrates unique aspects of the commingling of marine science and policy.
The first example, deep-sea drilling, has a long history in the evolving marine
science and policy framework. After a rocky start to drilling research, the Deep Sea
Drilling Project (DSDP) was introduced in 1966 as a comprehensive drilling program
designed to extract hundreds of sediment cores from the ocean floor in an effort to
learn more about the structure and composition of the earth's crust.75 The research
was extremely successful and continues today under the Ocean Drilling Program
(ODP), providing more information on the history of the earth through the deep-sea
sediments obtained in coring. 76 While the goal of deep-sea drilling is to obtain samples
75 supra, Note 3, pp. 156-158, pp. 214-219.
7 6supra, Note 1.
of sediment and is not obviously an experiment, it qualifies for the definition of
experimental research used in this thesis. The sampling method significantly modifies
the benthic environment at the drill site and has the potential to seriously pollute
the overlying water column should the drill reach an undetected hydrocarbon deposit
and cause an underwater blowout.
Deep-sea drilling is an excellent candidate for analysis because it covers the entire
time period of interest and has successfully endured the changing political and soci-
ological climates. The scientists involved in this research have adeptly transitioned
from an independent phase into an international phase and are now attempting to
promote public awareness to enter a more democratic phase. Deep-sea drilling will
be described in the context of these three phases to emphasize the transitions and
the roles of the scientists in these transitions.
The DSDP began in the 1960s when funding was relatively abundant and compe-
tition for those funds was almost nonexistent. Scientists were able to conduct their
research without much external involvement.7 7 With the 1970s came international
pressure to distribute scientific knowledge and experience to the international com-
munity about global resources as well as domestic pressure to reduce and distribute
the growing costs of large-scale research. In response to these and other pressures,
the DSDP became an international project in 197478 and the DSDP soon became
an ideal example of a successful international scientific collaboration.7 9  Deep-sea
drillng research continues to exist through the ODP and current plans are to extend
deep-sea drilling research past its current ending date in 2003 by expanding current
operations and developing a new set of research goals. In furthering this expansion,
the ODP project managers are actively seeking to enter a more democratic phase
in their research by inviting public involvement in an attempt to garner support for
future funding.8 0
77Ellins, K.K., Science Coordinator, JOIDES office, Personal communication, March 1998.
78 supra, Note 7.
79Nierenberg, W.A., "The Deep Sea Drilling Project after Ten Years," American Scientist, 66(1),
January-February 1978, pp. 20-29.
80JOI, "Understanding Our Dynamic Earth Through Ocean Drilling: Ocean Drilling Program
Long Range Plan," March 1996.
What follows is a chronicle as well as an analysis of the development of deep-sea
drilling over the last fifty years, from its unusual introduction up to its current state
as a respected project. The history of deep-sea drilling and the changes it underwent
as the science and technology evolved in the socio-political framework will initially
be examined. Since this history includes the failed first effort at large-scale deep-
sea drilling, Project Mohole, the first section of this chapter will be devoted to a
description of Project Mohole and an analysis of why it failed. The second section
will then introduce and dissect the DSDP and ODP, emphasizing the transitions in
the research to internationalization and then to democratization. In preparation for
the development of the policy protocols in the final chapter, the third section will then
analyze the research in terms of its benefits and risks, both perceived and real. This
final section will be an attempt to draw out the relevant factors that have allowed it
to endure as long as it has.
3.1 Project Mohole
While the first attempt at large-scale deep-sea drilling, Project Mohole, failed to
accomplish its objectives and was eventually cancelled by Congress, an analysis of
the project is included here to emphasize several of the reasons that its successor, the
DSDP, prevailed. Project Mohole is especially important as it sets the stage for the
introduction of the DSDP.
3.1.1 Introduction of deep-sea drilling
Drs. Gordon Lill and Carl Alexis of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) whimsically
formed the American Miscellaneous Society (AMSOC) in 1952 to deal with the large
number of oceanographic research proposals that did not fit into any of the usual
scientific categories. In 1957, at an informal gathering of prominent oceanographers,
Dr. Walter Munk of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO) and RADM Harry
Hess, USNR of Princeton, were lamenting the fact that they considered all of the
currently proposed research unimaginative. Munk then proposed the radical idea of
combining the technologies of offshore drilling and new methods of deep-sea drilling to
drill into the earth's crust to determine the composition of the mantle. The plan was to
drill a hole in the ocean floor until just below the Mohoroviid (Moho) Discontinuity,
the interface between the earth's crust and the mantle.8s  By 1949, using seismic
refraction studies, Dr. Maurice Ewing of Lamont had determined that the Moho
interface was about 13 km below the seafloor while it was about 45 km underneath
continental land masses.8 2 The seafloor, therefore, was the logical place to drill.
Although Munk's idea was revolutionary, it was not the first time that a scientist
had proposed deep-sea drilling. In 1943 Professor T. A. Jaggar, founder of the Volcano
Observatory on Hawaii's Mount Kilaeua, had suggested that an ideal post-war project
would be to drill a thousand holes in the world's oceans to obtain core samples to
a depth of approximately 0.3 km.83 In addition, a large number of deep-sea cores
already had been studied and described as a result of the HMS Challenger expedition
of 1872-1876. While these cores did not cover a long period of time because of their
shallow penetration depths, they allowed an inventory of deep-sea sediment types to
be identified.84
Soon after the informal meeting, Hess brought the proposal to ONR which then
submitted it to the National Science Foundation (NSF). The NSF initially rejected
the proposal as "crazy." Hess then turned to the National Research Council (NRC),
the operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences, and convinced them to form
the "AMSOC Committee on the Moho," chaired by Dr. Gordon Lill. This time NSF
granted $15,000 to NRC to carry out a planning study directed by Dr. Willard F.
Bascom.8 5
The first offshore hole was drilled in March, 1961 40 km west of Scripps in 943 m
of water. A barge operated by the Global Marine Exploration Company was held in
place by four 200-horsepower outboard motors operated from a central joystick. In
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April, 1961 the same barge pulled a long core of basalt from 200 m below the sea
floor in a water depth of 3,537 m off Baja, California.86
3.1.2 The demise of Project Mohole
Although Bascom recommended a conservative approach to future drilling, the NSF
had taken over direct project management from the AMSOC committee and decided
to expand the project at a more rapid rate. The AMSOC committee had become
merely an advisory group to Project Mohole. Bascom thought that drilling from
this point forward should be done off of an intermediate size drill-ship of an existing
type and that the technical progress should be made in finite increments. Instead,
NSF held a public briefing on July 27, 1961 to set forth its request for proposals.
They invited contractors to bid on the largest drilling ship ever built. The successful
contractor would be responsible for 1) designing and building the ship, 2) locating
suitable drilling sites, and 3) drilling a series of holes which would penetrate the
earth's upper mantle. The NSF required that the contractor have "necessary experi-
ence, organization, technical qualifications, skills and facilities or the ability to obtain
them." In addition, they were to have "interest and enthusiasm in undertaking the
Mohole project." The proposals were due on September 11, 1961.87
Eleven contractors, including the Global Marine Exploration Company, submitted
proposals. The selection process quickly became mired in politics and eventually
Brown and Root, Inc. of Houston, a leading offshore engineering firm, was named
as the Mohole contractor. Although many of the personnel believed that the Global
Marine Exploration Company was the best firm in existence for experimentation in
new deep-sea drilling techniques, they had paired up with Shell Oil. The director
of NSF had avoided awarding the contract to any of the major oil companies as
he felt that their interest in oil exploration over science outweighed their extensive
technical expertise. Lill and Bascom dissociated themselves from the project and
Lill was replaced as the AMSOC committee chair by Dr. Hollis D. Hedberg, Vice-
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president of the Gulf Oil Corporation and an adjunct professor in geology at Princeton
University. Hedberg, however, supported Jaggar's original suggestion and thought
that the project would be better if a large number of holes to moderate depths were
made instead of one large Mohole. He peddled this intermediate approach around
Washington, D.C. and by November 1963 he was replaced as the chairman of the
AMSOC Advisory Committee to NSF."s
Two months later, NSF announced the new chair - Dr. Gordon Lill. The project
was to proceed as originally designed. Lill, however, immediately encountered prob-
lems. In 1959 the AMSOC committee, chaired by Lill, had originally proposed that
the effort could be done for under $10 million. Upon Lill's return to the project,
he found that the overall project cost was approaching $68 million. In early 1965
the Moho drill site was selected to be just south of the Hawaiian Islands, but soon
after one of the project's main supporters on Capital Hill died (Congressman Albert
Thomas of Houston, Texas). The new chair of the authorizing committee (Congress-
man Joe Evins of Tennessee) was not as supportive of the project that by now was
approaching $125 million in total project costs and moved to kill the project. In
August 1966, NSF announced that Project Mohole was to be discontinued.8 9
There were many reasons Project Mohole was doomed to failure. First, there
were very few marine geologists actually in support of the project. Most marine
scientists thought that an ocean sediment coring program would be more beneficial
than one deep hole. Instead, Project Mohole was a pet project of a few scientists,
many outside of the geological community. 90 In addition, although they were initially
given free reign, the scientific community that was behind the project was not able to
maintain control of its fate due to the involvement of the NSF, the White House, and
Congress.91 Finally, at the time the project started, offshore drilling was limited to
water depths of 100 m or less and was usually accomplished from platforms that were
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anchored in place. 92 To achieve the goal of drilling in very deep water, therefore, the
scientists became very involved in the research and development of drilling technol-
ogy. This R&D was expensive and the project costs soon outweighed any potential
benefits. 93
3.2 The Deep Sea Drilling Program and Ocean
Drilling Project
While the one deep hole to the upper mantle would not be accomplished, interest
within the geophysical community in deep-sea drilling had blossomed. Several con-
sortia had formed to advance the field of deep-sea drilling and attempted to distance
themselves from the aborted Project Mohole. One of these, the Joint Oceanographic
Institutions for Deep Earth Sampling (JOIDES), was successful in 1966 in receiving
funding from NSF for a small-scale drilling project on the Blake Plateau off eastern
Florida (the Ocean Sediment Coring Project). Previous consortia had failed primarily
because of the lack of cooperation between institute heads. JOIDES, however, was
organized through the work of several senior scientists at the original institutions:
the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution,
the Lamont Geological Observatory and the University of Miami. 94 With Miami
as the lead institution for the original work over the Blake Plateau, the consortium
commenced drilling with one of Global Marine's dynamically positioned drill-ships
that was on its way to the Grand Banks of Newfoundland under contract to an oil
company. The drilling went smoothly, but it was less a test of the technology than
a test of the flexibility of the four institutions to work effectively and harmoniously
together. 95
Because the contractual and scientific aspects of this project worked out well,
in 1967 the NSF awarded JOIDES $12.6 million for an 18-month drilling program in
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both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. 96 Since the NSF was only able to guarantee
$6 for the first year, the University of California took responsibility for covering
any remaining costs if the project had to be cancelled due to a lack of funds. 97
NSF recognized Scripps Institution of Oceanography as the head of operations for
JOIDES and the DSDP was established to gather scientific information that would
help determine the age and processes of development in the ocean basins. 98 The
DSDP had entered its first phase.
The initial 18-month contract with the NSF was for starting and operating the
program. In addition, there was a three-year renewal option with a release clause
every six months during that period. 99 Continued success in the collaboration between
academia, industry and government led to the three-year extension of the contract
from the NSF to Scripps to begin in 1969. The director of Scripps, Dr. William
Nierenberg, had wanted to transfer the program to some other entity after the initial
phase was over since he felt that there was no possibility that the program could be
more successful and that there was always the chance of some political or operational
failure. The geophysicists and geologists at Scripps, however, felt that it was their
institutional responsibility to continue, particularly because of the failure of several
previous efforts of institutional cooperation.10 0
A subcontract was given to Global Marine to build and operate a new drill-ship,
the D/V Glomar Challenger. In order to avoid some of the problems that plagued
Project Mohole, the chief scientists of the DSDP determined that they would avoid
all internal development as much as possible and leave the non-scientific operations to
outside contractors who would be better suited to develop the necessary technology.101
The ship was accepted by the DSDP in August, 1968 and the second phase of the
DSDP was carried out over the next 30 months in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian
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Oceans as well as the Mediterranean and Red Seas. 10 2
3.2.1 Internationalization
Although the cores had been taken from ocean basins around the world, deep-sea
drilling was initially a project sponsored solely by U.S. government funding agencies.
The 1970s, however, saw a change in the way that science was conducted and deep-
sea drilling was no different. There was pressure to share scientific knowledge across
national boundaries, especially when it involved research within the global commons.
Science was becoming internationalized.
There were several major factors behind the internationalization of the DSDP.
The first was the concern over the possible effect of the UN Conference on the Law
of the Sea discussion on the freedom to operate in certain waters because of various
claims of jurisdictional rights. The 1970s were a period of active Law of the Sea
negotiations and the outcome was still uncertain. Nierenberg and others felt that
international interference would be minimized if the project was supported by several
nations representing the different sides in the negotiations. 103
Another factor was the interest expressed by the international community in sup-
porting and more actively directing the deep-sea drilling efforts. The project was
already international in that nationals from several countries had participated in
many of the cruises. Various scientific panels were also international. The Planning
and Executive Committees, however, were completely comprised of U.S. scientists.10 4
The final major influence behind the internationalization was budgetary. The
U.S. was experiencing an economic slowdown and there was concern about the level
of support for science. Due to the high costs of maintaining the program many of the
scientists worried that the DSDP made a very visible target for congressional budget
cutting.105
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Interested countries were therefore offered a chance to buy into the DSDP at a
cost of $1 million a year beginning in 1973. The Soviet Union, Japan, France, Great
Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany soon did so. 10 6 In 1976, after the
addition of the five non-U.S. governments, the DSDP entered its final phase, the In-
ternational Phase of Drilling. JOIDES also expanded in 1976 to include international
scientists that provided scientific planning and program advice. The international
partners were guaranteed the opportunity to help guide the scientific direction of
the DSDP, participation in all of the cruises, and access to all of the data, samples,
technical plans and specifications for equipment and techniques developed by the
program. 107
In determining that it was in their best interest to encourage international partic-
ipation in the DSDP in the 1970s, the JOIDES administrators were able to establish
a framework that satisfied the diverse requirements of the participants. The or-
ganizational structure of the DSDP became much more complex so that all of the
collaborating nations could participate fully in the planning and execution of the
drilling. This organizational structure, while not the most efficient, has ensured that
the entire international deep-sea drilling community shares fully in the responsibilities
and benefits of the program. 10 8
It has been recognized that although extremely inefficient, international partic-
ipation in the drilling programs has made deep-sea drilling scientifically broad and
economically cost-effective. In addition, the basic research programs carried out by
complementary basic research programs in geology and geophysics by the partici-
pating nations are a major contribution to the development of specific proposals for
drilling sites. 109
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3.2.2 Transition from DSDP to ODP
By 1978 the U.S. component of JOIDES included ten universities and oceanographic
institutions. Together these members established a non-profit corporation, Joint
Oceanographic Institutions, Inc. (JOI), designed to plan and manage the geologi-
cal and geophysical explorations proposed by U.S. institutions associated with deep-
ocean drilling and to foster other oceanographic research. 110 In 1981 the participating
institutions named JOI as the prime contractor for the DSDP.111
In the late 1970s it was recognized that the Glomar Challenger was nearing the
end of her useful lifetime and that a ship with greater capabilities was needed to
carry out the long-term scientific objectives of the community. 112 The D/V Glomar
Challenger was retired in November, 1983 and the DSDP was terminated. From
August 11, 1968 to November 11, 1983, over 97 km of cores were recovered from 624
sites under the auspices of the DSDP.113
In 1983 the Board of Governors of JOI unanimously selected Texas A&M Uni-
versity (TAMU) as the science operator for drilling for the proposed scientific ocean
drilling program. They had received several statements of interest and capabilities
from several member institutions and determined that TAMU was in the best posi-
tion to carry forward the implementation of the scientific objectives developed by the
international community. The selection of TAMU recognized the commitment of the
university through partial funding of faculty positions assigned to the program and
new physical plant facilities, the value of its large engineering faculty with special
capabilities in drilling technology, the offer to negotiate an overhead rate structure
as favorable as that existing under the present program, and their close association
with offshore drilling expertise. 114
Because of the economic conditions in the petroleum industry due to a world-wide
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drop in oil prices, a number of relatively new advanced ocean drilling vessels were
available. 115 After minor modifications, these ships would be capable of carrying
out the scientific objectives of the ODP. In 1983 TAMU proposed the use of the
SEDCO/BP 47, which had been built in 1978 as a conventional oil-drilling ship. (In
1996 the SEDCO/BP 47 was officially renamed the JOIDES Resolution.) TAMU
arranged for the construction of new laboratories and other structures necessary for
scientific ocean drilling in the fall of 1984 and drilling resumed in January, 1985.116
The ODP was underway.
The JOIDES Resolution uses a dynamic-positioning system to maintain location
and does so by means of 12 computer-controlled thrusters. Drilling can be done in
water depths up to 8235 m and as many as 9150 m of drill pipe can be used.117 Cur-
rently there is no blowout prevention or riser drilling capability as is standard practice
in the petroleum industry to prevent dangerous levels of hydrocarbon accumulation.
Extensive site surveys are done before any drilling site is approved and no proposal is
accepted if there is even a remote possibility of encountering hydrocarbons."11 If gas
is detected at a drill site, the standard procedure is to remove the drill pipe immedi-
ately and the ship leaves the area as a blowout would not only have the potential to
pollute a large area of the ocean floor, but the safety of the people on board the ship
would also be at risk.
The organizational structure continues to evolve in order to meet the needs of a
diverse scientific community and the funding agencies of nineteen nations. 119 ODP
is currently funded by the U.S. NSF, the Canada/Australia/Chinese Taipei/Korea
Consortium, the European Science Foundation Consortium, German, France, Japan,
and the United Kingdom. 120 To date (through Leg 173, April 1997), the JOIDES
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Resolution has drilled 1,199 holes for a total of approximately 92 miles of sediment 121
and the current U.S. funding agreements provide support until 2003.122
3.2.3 Democratization
While deep-sea drilling has not encountered the public scrutiny that has affected
many other scientific projects, it is worth noting that the program is in fact trying to
encourage more public involvement. JOIDES has established a public affairs working
group in an attempt to increase the public's awareness of the program and its suc-
cesses. The goal of the increased public awareness is to increase public support for
the project so that it may continue to receive current levels of funding if not more. 123
Even as early as 1986, the President of JOI, Dr. James Baker, recognized the need
for increased public support for the project due to the stringent levels of funding
available.124
A panel reviewing the 1992 to 2003 portion of the ODP concluded that the ODP
must advance its cause and justify its existence within the scientific community and
to the educated public if it hopes to make the case to expand substantially beyond
2003. It concluded that the ODP had produced very exciting science and should
therefore contribute visibly to the public understanding of science. 125
3.3 Evaluation of deep-sea drilling
In examining the deep-sea drilling case study, it becomes apparent why the DSDP and
ODP were successful where Project Mohole was not. Whereas Project Mohole did not
have the support of the relevant scientific community, the DSDP and ODP have had
broad support amongst geophysicists and geologists, many of whom have participated
mark, Finland, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
Turkey.
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in the programs. 126 These same scientists have been able to maintain almost complete
control of their research program and have kept it a purely scientific project. Project
Mohole became mired in politics early on and the scientific community lost all control
over the direction of the research. Finally, the scientists in the DSDP focused on the
scientific aspects of the research and used only technology made available to them
through industry. By avoiding internal development in the beginning in areas where
they were not as capable, they avoided the escalating costs that plagued Project
Mohole and eventually led to its end.
In addition, the particulars that have led to the eventual success of the deep-sea
drilling experiment fall into two major categories. First, and foremost, the benefits of
the program have been tremendous. The early successes of the program established
its reputation in the scientific and funding communities as one of extraordinary promi-
nence and it took on a life of its own. Second, the ability of the administrators to
recognize the changes in the funding climate and their flexibility has allowed them
to promote their project effectively. The sections below elaborate upon the reasons
deep-sea drilling has been able to endure without any significant controversy.
3.3.1 Cost/benefit analysis of deep-sea drilling
Deep-sea drilling has provided evidence for many of the fundamental earth science hy-
potheses that have led to scientists' current understanding of the earth. The original
DSDP cruises confirmed the theory of plate tectonics and provided crucial evidence in
the development of that field as the ages of ocean basins and their dynamic processes
were determined. Later DSDP cruises concentrated on the nature of the oceanic
crust, the sedimentary history of the passive ocean margins, and sediment dynamics
along active ocean margins. 127 The early successes of this project combined with the
relatively low funding levels allowed the scientists to continue and expand their efforts
as the benefits of the program were tremendous. The timing of the DSDP was also
fortuitous. The project was introduced at a time when the field of earth sciences
126
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was maturing from one of empirical status to one in which substantial theories and
hypotheses about major tectonic processes were flourishing. The evidence obtained
by the DSDP was essential in this transition. 128
Benefits of deep-sea drilling
The DSDP was successful from the start. On Leg 1 Site 2, core samples under a
water depth of 1067 m revealed the existence of salt domes. The potential of oil
beneath deep ocean salt domes is an important avenue for commercial development
and oil companies had yet to venture into deeper waters. Because the purpose of
the DSDP was scientific exploration, however, oil companies were given samples only
after agreeing to publish their analyses. 129
In 1962 Harry Hess had submitted an "Essay in Geopoetry" to the ONR which
detailed his ideas of seafloor spreading and substituted the theory of plate tecton-
ics for the theory of continental drift, 130 supporting the ideas previously set forth
by W. Jason Morgan and Xavier Le Pichon.'31 While many geophysicists came up
with evidence of plate tectonics in the form of magnetic reversals and seismological
records that supported Hess's claims, most geologists wanted confirmation from the
paleontological data that only deep-sea drilling could provide. Because of this, one of
the first projects undertaken by the DSDP (Leg 3) was the drilling of 17 holes at 10
different sites across the Mid-Atlantic Ridge in the South Atlantic Ocean. Working
in water depths of 2.1 to 4.7 km, the drill crews penetrated the entire sedimentary
column and brought back a wealth of information. The paleontological evidence was
overwhelming. Within one year of commencement and about $15 million, the DSDP
had provided definitive proof of concept for seafloor spreading and plate tectonics. 132
The theory of plate tectonics has revolutionized the field of geophysics and its con-
firmation was the pivotal point in the understanding of the dynamic processes of the
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earth.
Since then, deep-sea drilling has also provided data on a variety of Earth's basic
processes. Scientists from a variety of disciplines use the cores to learn about the
evolution of life in the sea, the temporal nature of global climate, ocean currents,
and Earth's magnetic field, to name a few. DSDP cores in the Mediterranean showed
conclusively that the Straits of Gibraltar had been shut off twice in recent geologic
times, an effect of sea level change."33 One of the ODP's earliest accomplishments
was to demonstrate that fluids move through rocks at continental margins as well as
at highly fractured mid-ocean ridges. 3 4 The ODP has also drilled into sedimentary
deposits that contain long and extremely detailed records of climate change. This
sedimentary record provides an opportunity for scientists to study climate oscillations
at high frequencies over a long period of geologic time so that subdecadal-scale events,
such as the El Nifio Southern Oscillation, can be examined. 135
In addition to the scientific achievements, the DSDP was accompanied by many
advances in deep-sea drilling technology. In addition to overcoming problems of
drilling in deep waters and penetration into basaltic layers, the DSDP was the first
to solve the problem of replacing worn drill bits and threading the corer back into
the same drill hole for deeper penetration. This was accomplished by using sonar
scanning equipment and a re-entry cone with a larger diameter than the actual drill
hole.' 36 In addition, in 1979 the hydraulic piston corer was introduced and virtu-
ally undisturbed cores of the soft sediment layers could be obtained. Through the
accumulation of knowledge from this project and the advances in coring ability, new
areas of research became available and the physical and chemical characteristics of
the ancient oceans were suddenly obtainable by 1980. The entire paleoceanographic
community now had a completely new data set with which to work at a time when
the history of the earth was becoming of great interest. 137
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Costs of deep-sea drilling
A discussion of the benefits cannot neglect the costs of the program. The ODP is
currently funded at about $45 million/year, up from $35 million in 1986.138 A large
fraction of this is covered by U.S. funding agencies with the remainder divided up
between the international partners. So far, this level of support has been deemed
appropriate for the results that have been obtained. The challenge will come in 2003
when the desired funding level triples.139
While ODP will expire in 2003, the international drilling community will not have
exhausted the potential of deep-sea drilling and plans are currently being developed
to continue the deep-sea drilling and coring under a new program currently known
as the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP). The necessary funding levels for
this expanded program are expected to be three times that of current funding and an
intense effort to increase the level of international participation is now underway. 140
Japan is expected to assume an international financial leadership role matching
that of the United States in 2003 so that the IODP may acquire a drilling vessel
with riser drilling capability in addition to a JOIDES Resolution-type ship.14 1 Riser
drilling capability is needed to prevent the possible blowouts and serious damage
to the environment that has kept the DSDP and ODP from drilling in potentially
dangerous areas. Japan has taken a lead in the acquisition of this technology as
most of the area around Japan has been off-limits to the DSDP and ODP because of
the presence of hydrocarbons. Blowout prevention capability would allow Japan to
accomplish many of its scientific objectives without the risks associated with drilling
near hydrocarbon deposits.' 42
Even with the addition of Japan as an equal funding partner to the U.S., the
success of the IODP depends on the additional commitment of funding agencies and
scientists from institutes and universities around the world. The German represen-
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tative to the JOIDES Executive Committee complained in a 1998 meeting that the
program is already suffering because partners are not able to meet or increase their
levels of contribution. 14 3 JOIDES is currently soliciting new countries to join as as-
sociate partners and is attempting to encourage the already participating nations to
contribute more. The future success of the program will depend entirely on their
success at increasing the amount of available funding. 144
Risks of deep-sea drilling
The primary risks associated with the project involve the safety of the scientists
and crew aboard the research vessel and the destruction of the environment in the
neighborhood of the drilling sights. Both of these concerns are legitimate and are
addressed through the proposal acceptance mechanism. The safety of the people
involved in the coring is of utmost importance. No proposals are accepted if there
is considered to be any risk of danger to the ship or its personnel. 145 The extensive
site surveys that are conducted at proposed drill site locations are done in part to
determine the possibility of such a risk. Fortunately, there have never been any major
incidents where lives have been in danger as it would only take one accident to tarnish
the image of the entire program.
The risk of environmental damage is primarily that due to the potentially extensive
pollution problem near the drill site that would occur should there be a blowout.
Again, the extensive site surveys are done in part to avoid this risk. Although the
drilling is done far from land and evidence of an oil spill would be unlikely to show up
along any coastlines resulting in less publicity than a standard oil spill, the amount of
damage that could ensue is an unknown quantity and the drilling community would
like to avoid it at all costs.
Although there have been no major incidents with hydrocarbon blowouts, there
is also the potential for environmental damage through normal drilling operations
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and deep-sea drilling has caused some damage to the ocean floor. When drilling first
started in the 1960s, the ocean floor was considered to be a desert - devoid of any
life. It is now known that the ocean floor can sustain highly diverse communities
of marine life under certain circumstances. Not only does drilling create large holes
in the bottom of the ocean and disturb the benthic community, on one occasion the
drilling actually created a new hydrothermal vent thereby significantly altering the
biological community in the surrounding area. 14 6
3.3.2 Flexibility of the administrators
While deep-sea drilling has always been proposal driven, 147 the management has
been extremely adept at recognizing and adapting to the changes in the political,
and therefore funding, climates. This has been true not only in their organizational
structure, but also in how they present the results of their research to establish support
for future funding.
The ability to recognize and meet the needs of the changing requirements of fund-
ing agencies is a difficult task. The U.S. Congress has consistently promoted the
need for funding of basic research although applied research is much easier to justify.
Deep-sea drilling has been able to promote itself almost entirely on its basic research
merits within the United States and has established itself as science for science's sake.
In Great Britain, however, the trend has turned towards support for science for so-
ciety's sake and the results of deep-sea drilling are couched in terms of their benefits
to society when presented to the decision makers there.148
In addition to being flexible in terms of how the project is presented to funding
agencies, the project managers have also remained flexible in terms of project ob-
jectives. The goals of the DSDP and ODP have changed with the evolution of the
science as more information became available on the dynamics of the earth. The
transition from the DSDP to the ODP occurred at about the same time a transition
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in project goals was taking place. The ODP was able to pick up where the DSDP had
left off and revitalized the project with a new set of objectives. Recently, emphasis
has been put onto the evidence of environmental conditions of the ancient oceans and
of climate changes through time because of the enhanced public and scientific interest
in problems of global change.
This flexibility in project goals while still maintaining the program's overall mis-
sion has allowed deep-sea drilling to endure the political and sociological changes
that affect funding levels and support for the project. The scientists planning the
long-range objectives for IODP are taking this into consideration as they develop
the scientific plan. They are intent on improving the available technology so they
can move into areas that have recently become of interest. In addition, they are
establishing goals that are based across a broad range of scientific issues that will
provide practical benefits to society as they seek to better understand the complex
earth system. 149
149
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Chapter 4
Acoustic Tomography
While deep-sea drilling has incurred almost no public scrutiny, this next area of
research includes the benchmark example of public involvement in oceanographic
research. This chapter is devoted to a description of two experiments utilizing acoustic
tomography, the use of sound to measure the average ocean temperature between
two points, and the public scrutiny they faced. One of the experiments in particular,
the Acoustic Thermometry of Ocean Climate (ATOC) Experiment, came under an
intense public scrutiny that grew into an emotionally charged battle over the fate of
the experiment. This experiment, therefore, is emphasized throughout the chapter
while the other experiment, the Heard Island Feasibility Test (HIFT), was a precursor
to ATOC and is also included to set the stage for the introduction of ATOC.
The controversy that developed over ATOC was framed by a debate over the
potential impact of the experiment on marine mammals versus the benefits of better
climate change information that the experiment could produce. This debate took
place on three distinct levels:
1. Many in the scientific community thought that the problem was poorly framed
for the data that would be generated. There was not only debate among scien-
tific disciplines, there was also debate within the physical oceanography com-
munity as to whether data provided by acoustic tomography would actually be
relevant to the question of global warming.15 In addition, while many marine
biologists felt strongly that the project would not generate enough new data
to warrant the risks to the health of marine mammals, others thought that the
risks would be miniscule."5 There is still debate within the scientific community
as to the scientific value of the project. 152
2. Many environmental groups felt that global warming has already been confirmed
and that another (expensive) research program that would just restate what
is already known would not be prudent - especially in light of the potential
environmental impact. 153
3. A few groups were concerned that if the temperatures in the Pacific Basin were
shown to cool over the next decade, ATOC would provide policy makers a false-
negative on the existence of global warming and give them an excuse not to take
measures to mitigate climate change. These groups did not want the health of
the marine mammals to be put at risk in exchange for information they felt
would be misused. 154
The controversy was then exacerbated by the persistence of misinformation, mis-
trust, and a poor execution of the democratic process on both sides of the debate. 155
More so than any other oceanographic research that preceded it, ATOC faced a pub-
lic scrutiny that eventually had a great impact on the work that the scientists were
finally allowed to conduct.
Whereas deep-sea drilling exemplified the internationalization of oceanographic
research and the positive effects that this transition had on the quality and character
of the science, ATOC is one of the best examples of the democratization of oceanogra-
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phy and the potential effects, both positive and negative, of this transition. Because
this case study was chosen as an example of how public scrutiny can change the di-
rection of the scientific work, the description of the research will be separated into
two sections. The first section of the chapter is an account of the development of the
experiment, including the HIFT, and the details of the research as it was originally
intended. The second section is devoted to the controversy caused by the experiment
and the modifications that this controversy effected in the design of the experiment.
In addition to a description of the experiments and the events leading to the
emotionally-charged controversy over ATOC, this chapter also includes an analysis
of the actions and reactions of the scientists with regard to the public. The third
section of the chapter analyzes the interaction between the scientists and the public
within the democratic process and the characteristics of this interaction that served
to both interfere with as well as promote the research. The extreme negative reaction
of the public to ATOC took the scientists completely by surprise and many mistakes
were made in the attempts to push the experiment ahead as planned. Those elements
that created misunderstanding and controversy as well as those that facilitated the
progress of the research will be drawn out in preparation for the development of the
policy protocols in Chapter 6.
4.1 The proposed Acoustic Thermometry of Ocean
Climate experiment
Acoustic tomography is a signal processing technique developed by Dr. Walter Munk
of SIO and Dr. Carl Wunsch of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the
1970s that detects changes in ocean temperatures by measuring the travel time of
low-frequency sounds (< 100Hz) transmitted across large distances. 15 6 The wide
geographic and year-round coverage that acoustic tomography can provide has en-
couraged scientists to present it as a tool that can provide much more accurate data
156Yam, P., "The man who would hear ocean temperatures," Scientific American, January 1995,
pp. 38-40.
than other conventional means of measuring global temperature trends. Because
this technique integrates temperature variations over a large region, the smaller scale
turbulent and internal-wave features that usually dominate point measurements are
averaged out and the large-scale dynamics can be better determined.'"
Acoustic tomography uses a phenomenon known as the deep sound channel or
the SOund Fixing And Ranging (SOFAR) channel. This channel is defined by the
depth at which the sound speed in water is a minimum and occurs at an average
depth of one kilometer. The speed of sound in water is a strong function of both
temperature and pressure. As the temperature of the water decreases with depth,
the speed of sound also decreases. Eventually the pressure effect compensates for the
decreasing temperature and the speed of sound increases deeper in the water column,
thus producing a sound speed minimum at an intermediate depth. The paths that
sound waves take in the ocean are determined by reflections off the ocean surface and
bottom and by changes in the sound speed along the paths. Because the sound waves
are bent away from the surface waters and also from the deep waters, they become
trapped at the depth of the sound speed minimum. This channel allows sound energy
to travel long distances through ocean basins without the scattering from the rough
ocean surface and bottom that results in energy loss.158
Although travel times must be measured to a nominal accuracy of 1 millisecond,
tomographic transmissions consist of long coded signals lasting 30 seconds or more.
These transmissions are audible near the source, but over most of the ocean they are
below ambient noise levels, requiring sophisticated spread-spectrum signal processing
techniques to recover them.159 The acoustic tomography experiments that are now
described attempt to use this technology as a tool to obtain better information on
large-scale ocean dynamics.
157WHOI Ocean Acoustic Lab, "Ocean Acoustic Tomography at WHOI," available at
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4.1.1 Heard Island Feasibility Test
In 1960, 130 kg of TNT were detonated off the coast of Perth, Australia. Approx-
imately 3.7 hours later, the sounds generated by the detonation were detected by
hydrophone receivers near Bermuda, nearly 20,000 km away. Munk reinterpreted the
Perth-Bermuda test in 1988 and proposed that sound could be used to measure basin-
scale temperature changes. 16' This proposal resulted in the HIFT, a test to assess the
feasibility of acoustic tomography for long-range monitoring of ocean temperatures
and therefore verification for global climate models. 161
The HIFT was conducted from 26-30 January, 1991 off the coast of Heard Island,
an uninhabited island located near Antarctica between Africa and Australia. The
scientists had access to U.S. Navy transducers whose operational use was limited to
a maximum depth of 300 m so the location was ideal because of the local sound
channel's close proximity to the surface (175 m) as well as the multiple, unimpeded
paths to receiving stations on both U.S. coasts. 162 The initial plan depended on
existing U.S. Navy bottom-mounted receiver arrays at Bermuda and both coasts of
North America. 163 During the planning stages of the experiment, however, several
scientists from around the world offered to take receivers out to sea to listen to
the transmitted signals. Although HIFT was jointly funded by the Department of
Energy, NOAA, NSF, and ONR for approximately $1.7 million, 164 the final result was
an informal collaboration between scientists from nine countries165 using a diverse set
of receiving systems. 166
HIFT transmissions were made on a pre-selected fixed schedule of one hour of
continuous transmission followed by two hours of silence for the entire test period from
160Munk,W., W.C. O'Reilly, and J.L. Reid. "Australia-Bermuda sound transmission experiment
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the R/V Cory Chouest. During any one transmission, the signal was broadcast from
five of the ten acoustic sources mounted on a vertical array at 175 m below the surface.
The sound source produced a maximum in situ source level of 221 dB centered at a
frequency of 57 Hz with a bandwidth of about 14 Hz and was of sufficient strength
that it was detected across five ocean basins. The experiment had been originally
planned to last for 10 days, but the onset of a gale terminated the transmissions after
only 35 transmissions. 167
Due to the unknown effects of anthropogenic sounds in the ocean environment,
various researchers and environmental groups were concerned that marine mammals
might be harmed as a result of the experiment. Some marine mammals use low-
frequency sound in feeding, navigating and communicating and the addition of such
noise into the ocean environment could be cause for caution. 168 After first learning of
HIFT in Science nine months before the proposed experiment, the executive director
of the Marine Mammal Commission (MMC) voiced his concerns to NOAA. Five
months before the experiment was scheduled to begin, NOAA decided to get scientific
feedback about HIFT's potential for harming marine life. 169 As a result, NOAA
and Australia's Department of Environment both determined that full environmental
impact statements were not required, 170 but permits were deemed necessary by NMFS
and Australia's National Parks and Wildlife Service171' because they concluded that
the data were insufficient to determine the extent to which the transmitted sound
could possibly affect marine mammals.
The original HIFT experiment needed an "incidental take" permit under the
MMPA, but such a permit usually required a minimum of one year to issue. A
biological component was then added to HIFT so that a permit to conduct scientific
research that would benefit the animals could be obtained. This permit typically
required only four months to process. 172 A U.S. scientific research permit in accor-
167Ibid.
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dance with §104(c)(3) of the MMPA was approved by the NMFS after a 30-day public
review period and consultation with the MMC.
The objective of the marine mammal portion of HIFT was to determine potential
short-term impacts on marine mammals. The study was to determine if marine
mammals react adversely to the transmissions by monitoring the following conditions
prior to, during, and after each transmission: (i) vocalization rates; (ii) respiration
rates (i.e. surfacing); and (iii) the direction of swimming.173 Even though the marine
mammal research was added to HIFT only a few months before the actual experiment,
it was determined to be an essential component of the overall experiment. 17 4
Although the marine mammal component of HIFT was limited due to its lack of
resources and time, the observers were able to conclude that there were no visible signs
of permanent damage to any local marine life. 17' The marine mammal assessment
and monitoring program was conducted before and during the sound transmissions
in accordance with the NMFS permit and MMC recommendations. Visual and hy-
drophone observations began four days prior to HIFT from the R/V Amy Chouest to
establish relative abundance and distribution of marine mammals in the study area.
Surveys were conducted during the transmissions to assess the effects of HIFT on
local marine mammals.17 Transmissions were to be suspended if marine mammals
were sighted or heard within one kilometer of the source vessel, marine mammals
were sighted or heard within the area ensonified at a level of 160 dB or greater (about
1.1 kilometer from the source vessel), or any marine mammals were injured. In the
event of an injured animal, the entire experiment would be suspended until the ex-
perimental protocol could be reviewed and revised by NMFS under consultation by
the MMC. 1 77
The success of HIFT was twofold. Not only was the sound signal transmitted al-
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most 18,000 km, but no marine mammals were visibly harmed. A successful feasibility
test was regarded by the scientists to be a necessary, but not sufficient, prelude to
expanding the ocean acoustic tomography effort." 78 Because the concept that sound
could propagate across ocean basins had been established through HIFT, scientists
then began to develop an experiment that would test whether or not the arrival times
of such signals could be determined at the precision needed to be useful in detecting
trends in temperature changes. Upon returning from Heard Island, the HIFT scien-
tists initiated the planning for the follow-up experiment, the Acoustic Thermometry
of Ocean Climate Experiment, in the Pacific. While a permanent sound source was
originally planned for Heard Island if HIFT proved to be successful,"" the remote
location of Heard Island as well as local oceanographic properties made the site in-
adequate for future research."s
4.1.2 Acoustic Thermometry of Ocean Climate
ATOC, originally intended to be a two year feasibility study that was proposed to
test existing climate models,'8 1 is currently in progress. Although eleven institutions
from seven nations are involved, it is funded primarily by the U.S. Department of
Defense through the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program
(SERDP) with sponsorship by the Advanced Research Projects Agency.182 ARPA is
mandated by Congress to invest in environmentally relevant issues and is therefore
interested in ATOC because of its implications for monitoring global warming.l s3
The technology and goals of ATOC are an extension of HIFT. While HIFT was a
test to determine the feasibility of detecting sound transmissions across long distances
throughout ocean basins, ATOC is a test to determine whether such a technique is
capable of producing high quality data on oceanic properties. In order to increase the
178 supra, Note 162.
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accuracy of the information collected, two sound sources are in use. Originally, one
was to be located 15 km off the coast of Kauai, Hawaii in 850 meters of water, and
the other 40 km off the coast of Point Sur, California in the Monterey Bay National
Marine Sanctuary. 184 The California location was chosen because of the proximity of
the sound channel to shore and the presence of Naval hydrophone arrays and of land-
based support facilities. An array of passive Naval hydrophone arrays throughout the
North Pacific and other hydrophone arrays near New Zealand, Point Sur, and Adak,
Alaska receive the signal at distances of 3,000-6,000 km.1 8 5
Because of the results of the Heard Island experiment, the ATOC scientists deter-
mined that a lower sound intensity could be used at basin-scales and decreased the
intensity from about 210 dB to 195 dB and increased the frequency from 57 Hz to
75 Hz with a broader bandwidth of 35 Hz on a schedule of one 20 minute transmission
every four hours. The lower intensity of the transmissions and the deeper position of
the SOFAR channel were also expected to decrease the intensity in the biologically
important upper ocean by more than 30 dB relative to HIFT.186
In addition to the acoustic tomography portion of the project, there was also a
marine mammal component, the Marine Mammal Research Program (MMRP). The
principal investigators had learned their lesson from HIFT and proposed to monitor
marine mammal reactions to the sound transmissions throughout the duration of the
experiment. $2.9 million was devoted to biological studies aimed at gathering data on
how undersea sounds affect the long-term health and behaviour of many species.' 8 7
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4.2 The existing Acoustic Thermometry of Ocean
Climate experiment
In February 1994, during the public comment period for the ATOC permit applica-
tions, a controversial message was sent out over MARMAM, the internet discussion
group for marine mammologists. The message stated that ATOC would cause tremen-
dous irreparable consequences to marine mammals and called for opposition to the
project. Although based on the incorrect scale for measuring sound in water (The
author did not take into account the 0(106) decrease in intensity from dB in air
to dB in water.), the information was rapidly disseminated throughout the marine
biological community."8 8 Following this initial incident, on March 24, 1994, the Los
Angeles Times reported that 677,000 marine mammals would be "taken" and that
a "deaf whale is a dead whale." The article implied that 677,000 marine mammals
would be killed as a result of the experiment. l s 9
Not surprisingly, the proposed ATOC experiment became subject to an unprece-
dented amount of negative publicity and became the focus of an emotional debate.
As a result, the experiment was delayed by 18 months, the initial project design was
dramatically altered, and over $1 million of the project funds were spent on attorneys'
fees. 190 The details of the experiment that created the conflict are first discussed and
then the changes that were made to the original experimental design through a series
of meetings between the constituents are described in this section. An analysis of the
scientists' role in the controversy will be carried out in the following section.
Again, the controversy was primarily over the risk to marine mammals weighed
against the benefits of better climate information and was debated at three distinct
levels. Because the effects of anthropogenic sound on marine mammals in the ocean
are not well understood, much of the debate was among scientists. This lack of
knowledge was at the core of the debate between the opponents and the proponents
1sssupra, Note 12, p. 55.
189Ibid.
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of ATOC as neither side had sufficient evidence to prove the potential for harm or the
lack thereof. While the experiment was presented as an ideal opportunity to learn
more about global climate change, many environmentalists felt that global warming
had already been confirmed and that the potential for any additional information
did not outweigh the possibility of negative impacts on marine mammals and other
biota.191 In addition, many felt that because previous tomographic experiments that
had looked at trends in ocean temperatures had found a recent decrease in core
temperatures, ATOC would produce a false-negative with regard to global warming
and would not produce data that should be used in determining national policy. 192
The controversy was fed by many misunderstandings of facts and definitions by
scientists and the public. The field of acoustics is highly technical and statements
by qualified scientists can easily be misinterpreted by the media and therefore the
public. As was previously mentioned, the intensity scale used for sound in the ocean
is different from that used in air. Because of the difference in scales and due to the
fact that water is a better conductor of sound than air, the intensity of 120 dB in
air is equivalent to an intensity of 181.5 dB in water. This difference is 61.5 dB on a
logarithmic scale and a factor of more than 1,000,000 on a linear scale. 193
The terms used by scientists and public agencies also proved to be misleading.
Whereas the MMPA defines the term "take" to mean "to harass, hunt, capture, or
kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal," the general
public is not aware of the specific meaning of "take" within the context of NMFS
permits. When the media reported that ATOC scientists had been given a permit to
"take" 677,000 marine mammals, the public outcry was understandable.
The location of the sound sources was another source of contention. The California
source was originally sited in the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary, a prime
feeding and breeding ground for several marine mammal species.' 94 The Hawaii source
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was also located near the seasonal feeding grounds of gray whales. The positioning of
the sources was a source of contention for many environmental groups who felt that the
technical aspects of the project were being valued more highly than the environmental
concerns. Ironically, the MMRP supported the Monteray Bay Sanctuary site as it
would have provided more marine mammals to observe. 195
Several meetings between constituent groups and input from public hearings gen-
erated more changes in the experimental design. The major change was the transfer
of control of the transmissions from the acoustic tomography group to the MMRP.
Signals would only be produced when the sea conditions were satisfactory for scien-
tific observers to document any changes in the distribution of behaviour of marine
mammals within 1 km of the sound source. The MMRP thus became the primary
focus of ATOC for the first 18 months. The acoustic climate measurement was put
on hold until the MMRP could evaluate the data regarding the response of marine
mammals to the ATOC sound source and determine whether an acoustic experiment
would be viable. 196
Most of the modifications made to the ATOC experiment were concessions to the
concerns over the well-being of the marine mammals. These modifications include:
* A ramping up of the intensity of the sound source over five minutes before the
twenty minute full power transmission to warn marine fauna of the approaching
transmission;
* A decrease in the source intensity from the proposed 195 dB to 185 dB for the
first six months with a possible increase to 195 dB after that, depending on the
reactions of marine organisms;
* A reduction in the transmission schedule from twenty minutes every four hours
each day to twenty minutes every four hours every fourth day; 197
* A transfer of the transmitter out of the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctu-
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ary to the Pioneer Seamount, approximately 88 kilometers west of Point Pillar,
California in 980 meters of water after the Sanctuaries and Reserves Division
of NOAA disproved of the original location. 198
In addition to the modifications in the experimental design, because of the delay to
the project there was a substantial amount of potential data lost because of the finite
lifetime of instrumentation that had already been deployed before the project was
put on hold. Several large-aperture vertical line arrays designed to resolve vertical
modes up to mode 10 had been built to better understand the modal distribution
that is required for the interpretation of long-range transmissions. 199 These arrays
were useless by the time transmissions actually started and were too expensive to
replace. 200
It is necessary to note that although many changes were made to the original
experiment and the acoustic tomography component of the experiment may suffer
because of these changes, not all of the changes were detrimental to the science
being carried out under ATOC. In particular, the emphasis on the marine mammal
component of ATOC instituted an actual experiment on marine mammals and sound
instead of a mere monitoring program. This type of research could generate useful
data on marine mammal reactions to sound that could reduce the uncertainties for
future acoustic research.
4.3 ATOC and the democratic process
The previous sections described much of the controversy generated by HIFT and
ATOC as well as the effects the controversy had on the direction of the original
experiments. This section examines the factors that led to such an inappropriate exe-
cution of the democratic process and discusses the actions of the ATOC scientists and
the public that served to both interfere with as well as promote a more constructive
198 supra, Note 177.
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public involvement.
Before the scientists' role in this debate is discussed, however, it must be made
clear that the goal of the democratic process in science should not be a consensus on
the scientific method, but rather a consensus on the responsibilities of the scientists
when conducting research that involves some degree of risk to a public good, i.e. the
oceans. Because of the uncertainties in evaluating risk and perceived risk, the debate
can become focused on the value of the scientific data. The real issue is not the
certainty of the data, however, but rather what the weighting of those uncertainties
should be. It is in this weighting process that the values of the public must be
considered.
An effective democratic process depends on two basic conditions: 1) all of the
relevant stakeholders must be active participants from the planning stages through
to a final analysis of the results and 2) there must be a solid foundation of trusted
information that is shared by everyone. Once these conditions have been met, con-
structive multiparty, multi-issue discussions can proceed. Unfortunately, behaviour
on all sides worked against an effective debate.
Lack of appropriate participation
The democratic process is only effective if all of the relevant stakeholders are active
participants. The public scrutiny took ATOC scientists by surprise. Even though
HIFT generated controversy, the scientists had predicted that the marine mammal
issue would not be nearly as critical in ATOC because of the smaller scale of the
research and the lower sound intensities. 20 1 Instead of applying their experiences
from HIFT toward a concentrated effort to mitigate potential controversy in ATOC,
the scientists assumed that the risks to marine mammals were no longer an issue as
HIFT had not shown any visible signs of permanent damage. The issues that had
been raised before HIFT, however, had not been resolved. There was still a lack of
hard data on the long-term effects of loud, low-frequency sound on marine mammals
201supra, Note 11.
and the proposed ATOC experiment had the potential to affect thousands of animals.
The democratization of science is a new paradigm and one not openly embraced
by most scientists. The ATOC scientists are no exception. Instead of acknowledging
the concerns of their opponents and inviting public comment, the ATOC scientists
dismissed the concerns and were frustrated that their research might be cancelled
for "no good scientific reason." 20 2 Scripps did send out public announcements in
attempts to combat the misinformation that plagued their experiment, 203 but their
participation in a public discussion of ATOC did not occur until a series of hearings
sponsored by the NMFS just before the experiment was initially scheduled to begin.20 4
In addition, while the public were willing participants in the process, many were
irresponsible in their behaviour. The scientists were insulted and physically threat-
ened by several individuals. 205 Opposing viewpoints are a necessary component of
debate, but if not voiced in an appropriate manner they add nothing to the discussion.
A lack of trusted information
The democratic process was also burdened with misinformation and misperceptions
resulting in strong opinions based on incorrect information. Much of this incorrect
information could have been prevented, or at least mitigated, by the ATOC scientists.
While much of the controversy in ATOC was initiated by the dissemination of
incorrect information regarding the intensity of the ATOC sound sources by a non-
ATOC scientist, the ATOC scientists could have provided better information about
their research before the public comment period. Scripps did send out a press re-
lease in 1993, announcing the experiment, but the release was printed in only a few
newspapers and did not mention the marine mammal component or the potential
harm to marine mammals. 20 6 Not only was the information not guaranteed to reach
the relevant stakeholders, but it was also incomplete. The method of informing the
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public through carefully worded press releases is too uncertain a strategy to use for
such purposes.
The experiment was also not presented in the best possible light from the begin-
ning. Instead of being presented as an experiment with the potential for producing
extraordinary types and amounts of information about the oceans never before col-
lected, the acoustic experiment was initially presented as a method to detect global
warming. 207 It was not until after the ATOC controversy was underway that the ex-
periment was presented for what it really was, an attempt to verify climate models 20 8
as well as a strategy for collecting other important oceanographic information.
The public also began to distrust the scientists themselves. Dr. Walter Munk has
been described as a "consummate salesman." 209 This was not the approach that was
needed in ATOC when dealing with the public in a highly emotional controversy. A
balanced and transparent presentation of the information needs to be given to the
public so that they trust the scientists and the information that is given to them.
There were also misperceptions that the ATOC scientists had relatively no control
over. Several environmental organizations, for example, concluded that there were
military implications associated with ATOC because it receives its funding from the
DOD through SERDP.210 Although there is no military component to the project, the
DOD funding source will always lead some people to distrust the motivation behind
the research.
While it is clear that the ATOC scientists were taken by surprise by an intense
public scrutiny, they cannot escape all responsibility for the controversy and the
resulting negative consequences. The scientists had the opportunity to learn from
their HIFT experiences and become active participants in a public debate. Instead
they assumed that the problems that had surfaced in HIFT had vanished and they
then became the defendants in a public trial. A better awareness of the potential for
conflict and an appropriate proactive public outreach could have mitigated much of
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the controversy that has damaged the integrity of their research.
Chapter 5
CO 2 Sequestration
The third and final area of research demonstrates the new awareness of marine sci-
entists to the increased public scrutiny they may encounter in their work. While
skeptical attitudes towards public involvement may not have significantly changed,
scientists are at least now recognizing that a concentrated effort at public outreach
in the early stages of their research may improve their chances at successfully with-
standing an intense public scrutiny.
This final case study describes a CO 2 ocean storage field study. It is the first step
in a progression of experiments that are being planned to determine the feasibility
of a serious attempt to sequester CO 2 in the oceans. What makes this experiment
significant for this discussion is that the principal investigators for the CO 2 ocean
storage field experiment have recognized that local acceptance of the project will de-
pend strongly on public outreach efforts. 211 In addition, it is also well understood that
the viability of ocean CO 2 sequestration as a greenhouse gas mitigation option may
ultimately depend on social and political considerations and that societal acceptance
can only occur if the public is included in the ongoing research and debate. 212 The
experiment, therefore, includes a public outreach component, something completely
foreign to most of the principal scientists.
21 1Adams, E. and H.J. Herzog. "Site Selection Study for an Ocean CO 2 Disposal Field Experi-
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Because it is nearly impossible to separate this feasibility study from the implica-
tions of large-scale ocean storage of C0 2, this chapter emphasizes the details of the
one experiment within the context of the larger problem. The first section of this
chapter, therefore, is devoted to the motivation behind the field experiment as well
as the overall effort to investigate CO 2 mitigation options. The second section will
describe the experiment itself. Since the experiment is still in the planning stages,
many of the details have not yet been finalized. Instead, the general structure of the
experiment will be discussed. The third section then looks at potential barriers to
the implementation of the experiment. These barriers come mostly in the form of
potential opposition to the experiment as opposed to technical or scientific obstacles.
Because of this, the final chapter of this thesis will use the CO 2 sequestration exper-
iment as a model for the application of the policy protocols designed to effectively
integrate the public. Before moving to the final chapter however, a description of the
public outreach efforts to date will be discussed in the fourth section of this chapter.
These efforts will then be used as a starting point for the application of the policy
protocols.
5.1 Motivation
The motivation for this experiment comes from the drive to find options to reduce
atmospheric CO 2 levels. Because of potential adverse effects on the global climate
due to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases such as CO 2, the world commu-
nity is pushing measures to mitigate these effects. The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is at the center of international efforts
to combat global warming. Adopted in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit, its ultimate
objective is "the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (man-made) interference with
the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production
is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner." 213 In promoting this objective, the Convention calls for states to develop
action plans to reduce their anthropogenic emissions of CO 2 and other greenhouse
gases to below their 1990 levels by the year 2000.214
Since the Convention, in the efforts to find mechanisms to reduce atmospheric
CO 2 levels, there have been several principal mitigation options suggested: 1) greater
conversion efficiency and fuel switching within the fossil fuel sector, 2) greater re-
liance on non-fossil fuel energy sources, 3) greater energy conservation and end-use
efficiency, 4) geo-engineering options to reflect solar radiation or increase CO 2 uptake
by phytoplankton or forests, and 5) methods to capture, and utilize, convert or store
CO 2 before emission to the atmosphere can take place. 21
5 The first four responses to
global climate change include many relatively low-cost CO 2 mitigation technologies
that are sometimes termed "least regrets" as in theory they not only reduce emis-
sions of greenhouse gases but provide benefits to society as well. Many scientists also
suggest that such actions might buy time to gain a better understanding of global cli-
mate change and to reduce possible negative impacts attributable to human-induced
climate change. 2 16 The major drawback of these options is their limited impact.
There are many who believe that although these technologies may be sufficient in the
short term, they will not be able to solve the problem in the long term as the global
population and energy demand continue to increase. 217
The fifth option, the capture and subsequent use or disposal of the CO 2 before
it reaches the atmosphere, is one of several more expensive long-term technological
responses. It is a controversial option, however, because it allows for the probable
continued large-scale use of fossil energy resources when the international environ-
mental community is stressing the reduction of CO 2 emissions and phasing out of
213
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fossil fuels. Proponents for the research and development of CO 2 sequestration argue
that it is judicious to explore all potential mitigation options now so that a broad
range of strategies is available in the future.218 Opponents may either argue that the
option is amoral in light of the international community's position on CO 2 emission
reductions or that global warming is a myth 219 and resources should not be spent on
mitigating a problem that does not exist.
Because the deep ocean is highly unsaturated in CO 2 and represents a poten-
tially significant CO 2 sink, it is considered a prime candidate for CO 2 storage. The
ocean currently contains the estimated equivalent of 140,000 billion tonnes of CO 2
(compared with annual worldwide anthropogenic emissions of about 22 billion tonnes
of CO 2).220 Storage of CO 2 in the deep ocean, therefore, is viewed by some as an
acceleration of the natural process of transferring CO 2 from the atmosphere to the
deep ocean. 221 The ability to dispose of large quantities of CO 2 , however, involves
many uncertainties in its effectiveness and the environmental impacts associated with
increased seawater acidity near the injection site. Efforts to understand ocean CO 2
sequestration technologies must be undertaken to better evaluate their potential and
to reduce their associated costs and risks before the technology may be considered a
viable alternative. 222
Ocean storage of CO 2 was first considered in 1977.223 Several follow-up studies
were then carried out in the late 1970s and 1980s, but it was not until the 1990s
that significant research efforts were undertaken, principally by researchers in Japan,
Norway and the United States.224 If the ocean storage option is to ever be seriously
considered, a combination of theoretical and experimental research efforts will be
required so that informed decisions can be made. Theoretical and laboratory research
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has been progressing, but experimental research is still in its infancy.225
5.2 The ocean CO 2 disposal experiment
The ocean CO 2 disposal field study consists of a series of pilot-scale tests with several
key objectives:
* to better understand the physical-chemical processes affecting the transport and
fate of CO 2 released as buoyant liquid droplets at water depths of about 1000 m;
* to demonstrate proof of concept;
* to develop and validate models of transport and fate, which in turn can be used
to more reliably predict the environmental impact of ocean disposal of C0 2;
* to establish CO 2 deployment techniques and field monitoring methodologies
that will help in future experiments. 226
While these issues are important, the primary goal of the principal scientists is a
functional experiment so that valid measurements can be taken.227
There are several possible mechanisms for the direct injection of CO 2 into the
ocean, but the field study will examine only one. Liquid CO 2 will be pumped through
a pipe from shore to the deep ocean and injected from a manifold lying on the ocean
bottom so that a rising droplet plume is formed. This option is considered to need
little technological development as it is relatively straitforward and minimizes the
need for complex engineering. In addition, it is relatively inexpensive (The project
budget is $3.8 million. 228 ) and is considered to have a low-medium impact on the
environment.229
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A series of tests will be carried out over a short time period during the summer
of 2000 - each test lasting several hours to a day.230 The CO 2 will be discharged at a
rate of 1 kg/s to allow for a full scale test of the nozzle design. This discharge rate
will also yield a plume of sufficient size for measurements and results in acceptable
costs for CO 2 use and handling. 231
After an extensive site selection study, it was decided that the optimal location
for the experiment is off the west coast of the big island of Hawaii.232 Pipe will be
laid for about 3 km west off the Natural Energy Laboratory of Hawaii Authority
(NEHLA) facility at Keahole Point to a depth of 700-1000 m. NEHLA has an um-
brella permit to conduct research to two miles out and has already received written
approval for the CO 2 sequestration experiment under that agreement.233 In addition
to NEHLA, personnel from the Pacific International Center for High Technology Re-
search (PICHTR) and the University of Hawaii on Oahu are also participating. The
extensive engineering expertise of these organizations should be extremely useful in
providing technical and scientific support for the experiment.234
5.3 Potential barriers to the experiment
As in the ATOC experiment, there is more than one potential controversy that could
hinder the CO 2 sequestration experiment. The first level of debate is over the potential
impact of the experiment itself on the marine environment. Opponents may argue
that the risks associated with intentionally introducing CO 2 into coastal waters are too
great and that the research should not be permitted. The second, more complicated,
level of debate is over the potential long-term implications of the research. Opponents
may argue that CO 2 sequestration is not in line with the international community's
position on global warming mitigation and that research that supports a science that
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fosters the use of fossil fuels should not be undertaken.
5.3.1 Impact on the marine environment
The first concern is the easiest for scientists to understand and debate as it involves
the balancing of scientific uncertainties. There are several environmental impacts of
ocean CO 2 disposal, but because the reaction of CO 2 with seawater causes a decrease
in the pH, the primary effect is the acidification in the area of the release point.
(Other impacts include the disturbance of the ocean bottom due to the installation of
the pipe and possible problems on land involving the transport and storage of large
amounts of CO 2.) The severity of the impact, however, varies substantially with the
injection scenario. From modeling results, depending on the method of release, pH
can be reduced to as low as about 4 at the injection point from its ambient value of
8. The results away from the injection point are even more complicated.235 Again,
the droplet plume model is expected to have a low-medium environmental impact.
The results of pH mapping from various disposal schemes are combined with the
knowledge of the effects of the expected pH exposures on marine life that would be
exposed to the plume to determine environmental impact. The measure of environ-
mental impact, however, has been mortality rates. Other effects, such as reduced
growth and reproduction rates, are not taken into account and could also have a
serious impact on marine ecologies.236
The effect on the physiology of marine organisms of increased concentrations of
CO 2 in seawater is dependent on both the magnitude of the increase of CO 2 as well
as the tolerance of the particular organism. Information is limited on the tolerance
and physiological responses of most species to an increased concentration of CO 2.
The organisms that would be most affected would be those unable to avoid regions
of low pH because of limited mobility (i.e., zooplankton, bacteria, benthic commu-
nity). In general, the sensitivity of marine organisms is related to the compensatory
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mechanisms, its energy requirements and its mode of life.237
Because of the uncertainties over the size of the impacted area as well as the level
of harm due to an intentional injection of CO 2 into the ocean, environmental groups
may feel that the risks are too great and that the project should not be allowed unless
a solid monitoring system is in place and the experiment can be aborted if unintended
consequences occur.
5.3.2 Potential long-term application
The CO 2 sequestration experiment is also inevitably linked to the possibility of its
long-term application at larger scales. This link makes it difficult to separate the
risks of the actual experiment from the risks and uncertainties of the use of CO 2
sequestration as a tool for mitigating CO 2 emissions in the debate over the value of
the experiment. Many environmentalists think that the primary effort should be put
into the capping and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and not mechanisms for
allowing continuing or increased emissions. This more complicated level of debate
may seem irrelevant to the scientists conducting the experiment, but it is an attitude
that prevails.238
There is also scientific uncertainty in the long-term application of CO 2 ocean
sequestration related to the efficiency of the mechanism. The storage capacity of the
ocean for CO 2 and the residence time of the injected CO 2 are both unknown quantities
and are presumed to depend strongly on the method and location of injection. 239
The potential for a long-term application also ties the research to industry al-
though industry is not supporting the research currently because of the high costs
associated with large-scale CO 2 sequestration. 240 Many environmental groups do not
trust any industry-related science because of the record of one-sided presentations of
the data. This mistrust may also have to be addressed.
In addition, in 1972 the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
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articulated several principles that have provided the basis for conventions that have
subsequently been developed to conserve the planet's resources. One of these prin-
ciples emphasized that measures which transfer damage from one biome to another
must be avoided. In the short term CO 2 sequestration in the ocean obviously vio-
lates this principle as it takes CO 2 that would pollute the atmosphere and deposits
it directly into the deep ocean. Scientists involved with the experiment claim that
ocean sequestration merely accelerates a natural process whereby the CO 2 would ul-
timately end up in the ocean as CO 2 concentrations in the ocean and atmosphere will
equilibrate in the long-term. Thus, the issue becomes clouded.
5.4 Public outreach
The public outreach component of the ocean CO 2 disposal field study is just begin-
ning. Because the goal is to educate and involve the public in a meaningful dialogue,
a gradual outreach strategy is being developed as opposed to a flashy public relations
campaign. The primary function that has been carried out to date has been informa-
tion gathering in Hawaii so that the scientists can be prepared to establish a sound
program. The key issues that have been investigated are:
* the dynamics of local politics,
* the names of key stakeholders and their perceptions of marine science,
* potential supporters as well as adversaries, and
* previous or current local environmental issues. 241
Hawaii holds a very complex web of environmental groups, government-based
interests, and research institutions. Some of these stakeholders have been identified
and will be approached in the near future to gage their opinions of the experiment.
Previous environmental issues that have surfaced in Hawaii, including ATOC, also
241Kildow, J.T., Progress Report in Final Report to PICHTR, 7 April 1998.
provide insight into the local dynamics that may provide support or opposition to
the CO 2 sequestration experiment.
Chapter 6
Policy Protocols for Marine
Scientists
The previous chapters have described the current state of affairs for oceanography and
marine science and have provided specific examples of relevant research in order to
establish the foundation for the policy protocols described in this chapter, the ultimate
goal of this thesis. Through the analysis of the co-evolution of marine science and
policy, the recent transition to a more democratic science becomes apparent and the
unease of marine scientists in this new era even more so. With this new democracy
comes an increased public scrutiny, for which most scientists are unprepared.
The policy protocols described below are designed to assist marine scientists con-
sidering experimentation in the oceans in maximizing the potential benefits of intense
public scrutiny and minimizing the possible costs. They are not a recipe for success,
but rather a set of guidelines to help scientists constructively utilize the input of the
public while still maintaining control over the direction of their research. Through the
utilization of the new set of policy protocols, scientists should be able to invite pub-
lic scrutiny and incorporate public participation while still maintaining appropriate
scientific methods and standards.
Because the circumstances surrounding each research project will be unique, the
protocols have been designed to be deliberately broad to capture as much of the
oceanographic research spectrum as possible. The protocols are then applied to the
ocean CO 2 disposal field experiment described in Chapter 5 in order to provide a
concrete example of their utility.
While a complete description of the policy protocols is given below, a condensed
version illustrates the basic approach to public involvement in marine scientific ex-
perimentation:
* Establish a broad support base within the scientific community.
* Identify stakeholders and engage in appropriate public outreach.
* Expect inefficiencies and plan accordingly.
* Conduct research in a transparent fashion throughout all of the phases of re-
search - planning, implementation, monitoring, and distribution of results.
* Maintain management flexibility capable of working with change and the rele-
vant interest groups.
These protocols give scientists a tool to use when participating in the democratic pro-
cess so they do not become its victims. They are now elaborated upon and discussed
within the context of the CO 2 ocean sequestration experiment.
6.1 Establish a broad support base within the sci-
entific community
Scientists should always expect detractors, even from within the scientific community,
but it is important to establish a strong network of support for potentially controver-
sial research. Establishing this support base does not mean that the scientists must
capitulate to others' opinions so that a consensus may be reached on a highly con-
troversial issue, but that they should seek input and support from areas they might
not have previously considered.
Scientifically broad support
When establishing the program within the scientific community, it is important to
seek input and support from within the narrow field of research with which the project
is most closely associated, but it is also wise to seek relevant outside support. A side
benefit of this exchange is that the experiment may become better science. By keeping
an open mind, scientists can learn more about their own problem by viewing it from
another direction.
ATOC scientists could have benefited from discussing their research with marine
biologists before they were forced to do so. Earlier discussions would have ensured a
better exchange of information and may have prevented many of the misunderstand-
ings that occurred. In addition, a better marine mammal component of the research
might have existed from the start without the reduction of the acoustic tomography
component.
Because the ocean CO 2 disposal field experiment has been established within the
context of the problem of large-scale CO 2 sequestration, the scientists have benefited
from exposure to the various faces of the problem from the very beginning. They
would be wise to continue discussions with the chemical and biological oceanographers
as their research progresses.
A broad support base may also be enhanced by accurately identifying and stressing
the importance of the science and the value of the data to be collected. The DSDP
and ODP were able to promote their research based on the importance of their science
alone. ATOC, however, missed the opportunity to present itself as a valuable source
of an enormous amount of novel information on many oceanographic properties and
therefore did not emphasize the importance of the science as it could have. The CO 2
experiment needs to follow the example of the deep-sea drilling research and stress
the scientific benefits that will come of the research as opposed to just the potential
applied benefits if ocean sequestration should become a viable CO 2 mitigation option.
Geographically broad support
In establishing a support base, it is also prudent to consider the location of the
experiment. Given local interests, local scientists may provide a certain level of ac-
countability and trustworthiness that is not present in a group of "outsiders." Care
must be taken, however, to ensure that the objectives of the cooperating institutions
are reconciled before formally proceeding. As shown in the Project Mohole experi-
ment, differences in opinion at the highest levels can help to destroy projects. The
earlier the various objectives/agendas can be identified, the earlier a consensus can
be worked out and a united front presented.
Being perceived as "outsiders" could seriously impede the CO 2 sequestration re-
searchers as it did the ATOC scientists in Hawaii. Fortunately, there are several
scientific institutions on the islands that are participating in the project. The prin-
cipal scientists of the ocean CO 2 disposal experiment, NELHA, PICHTR, and the
University of Hawaii may be able to work together, but a tightly coordinated effort
must be undertaken. While the University of Hawaii and the backgrounds of the
principal scientists are primarily research-oriented, NELHA and PICHTR are more
concerned with the economic development of Hawaii. These objectives are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive, but they will require consideration in the decision-making
process.
For issues involving international concerns, an international foundation should
also be established to provide credibility to the project. The collaboration between
the U.S., Japanese, and Norwegian governments in the CO 2 sequestration experi-
ment complicates matters with regard to funding issues and differences of government
agendas, but it establishes an international level of accountability and trustworthi-
ness within the international community. Again, the differences in objectives must
be identified early and reconciled if the project is to have an obtainable goal. For-
tunately, the CO 2 scientists are well aware of this potential hurdle and are currently
working toward a suitable arrangement.
6.2 Identify stakeholders and engage in appropri-
ate public outreach
All possible stakeholders must be identified and a dialogue must be established with
each of them so that potential problems may be recognized and resolved before they
magnify. While there will always be fringe elements, not every opponent should be
viewed as such. Every attempt must be made to bring the relevant stakeholders
to the table so that a balanced view of the problem is presented. If a decision is
made without all sides present, the decision will not be respected as valid, and strong
objections may be brought up at a later, more inconvenient time.
Once the stakeholders have been identified, it is important to engage in a grad-
ual public outreach early in the planning stages instead of bombarding them with a
flashy public relations campaign once all of the details have been set. As seen with
ATOC, high visibility without an informed public can lead to the rapid dissemination
of incomplete and inaccurate information. The difference between public outreach
and public relations becomes apparent when their objectives are compared. Public
outreach attempts to educate the public by providing accurate and complete infor-
mation while public relations attempts to persuade the public by providing only the
information that will support the position of those that are supplying the information.
If the process is to be truly democratic, all of the information must be made available
and public relations is not an appropriate mechanism for engaging the public.
The ocean CO 2 disposal field experiment involves many stakeholders, including
environmental groups, fishermen, recreational interests, commercial ventures estab-
lished at NELHA, political groups, and local scientific organizations. As discussed
in Chapter 5, representatives from these groups have been identified and discussions
will begin to take place in the near future. These discussions should be low-key and
should attempt to provide as much information as possible. The scientists should be
willing to listen to the concerns of the stakeholders at this time without immediately
dismissing them. The initial conversations will be extremely educational for all sides
if the dialogue is kept open and accusations are left at the door.
6.3 Expect inefficiencies and plan accordingly
As is the case with international cooperation, a democratic cooperation will be
extremely inefficient. Many scientists who are involved in international collabora-
tions recognize the value of such cooperation and see the tradeoff in efficiency as
worthwhile. 242 This is not yet the case for the democratic process. It must be un-
derstood that the democratic process is not efficient, but that there are benefits to
be gained from entering into a democratic partnership with the public. Once this
is recognized, the planning process can begin to accommodate the new inefficiencies
and not become overwhelmed by irrelevant issues.
The arguments for the democratization of science and science policy are many:
(i) All citizens support science through their tax dollars and experience the profound
consequences of science, both good and bad. (ii) In a democracy, those who experience
the consequences of an activity and those who pay for it ordinarily expect a voice in
decisions. (iii) Scientific leaders have no monopoly on expertise, nor do they have a
privileged ethical standpoint, for evaluating the social consequences of science and of
science policies. (iv) Non-scientists already do contribute to science and science policy.
(v) Elite-only approaches are antithetical to the open, vigorous, and creative public
debate on which democracy, policy-making, and science all thrive. (vi) There is a
danger that public support for science will erode if other perspectives are excluded.243
Promoting the democratization of science can help establish U.S. science policies
that are more socially responsive and responsible, more widely supported, and more
consonant with the tradition of openness in science and a healthy democracy. 244
The CO 2 sequestration scientists have shown an awareness of the increased public
scrutiny that they may face and are taking steps to solicit the public's input. Because
it is a long process they have begun to consider their options during the initial plan-
ning stages of the experiment. Care must be taken, however, to see that the public
outreach is actually incorporated into the experiment preparations and not left on a
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back burner until it is too late.
6.4 Conduct research in a transparent fashion
Transparency is the key to establishing public trust. If the public thinks that relevant
information was withheld, decisions will not be trusted - even if they are correct. The
next several issues deal with the transparency of the research throughout the entire
project. While this is most important during the planning stages when the public
trust is being established, it cannot be ignored once the experiment starts. Public
outreach is a long-term commitment and needs to be treated as such.
Because the CO 2 experiment has not yet begun, each of the following steps applies
broadly to the project. As the experiment develops, a picture of the action appropriate
for the CO 2 experiment will become better defined. For example, uncertainties still
exist as to the necessary permits. 245
Obtain appropriate permits and authorization
Applicable legislation and regulation must be identified and complied with. This
should also be done as early as possible as permitting agencies must also deal with
the public and the process can take more time than expected.
Present what is known and what is not known
An unambiguous presentation of the information and level of risk involved must be
made to the public before the experiment begins so that all parties are aware of the
goals and uncertainties of the project. A rational opinion may be made only if all of
the data is made available.
245supra, Note 232.
Carry out the research as openly as possible
Document everything and insure high quality. The public trust needs to be main-
tained if the scientists are to produce data that will be considered valuable in the
end.
Establish a reliable monitoring system
In any experiment that involves risk to the environment, a reliable monitoring process
is essential. The process must be considered open and neutral to all involved parties
or the entire procedure is meaningless. The oversight of the experiment is necessary
to validate the public's concerns over potential risks and to assure them that the
risks are being mitigated. Assurances must also be made that the experiment will be
aborted if unintended consequences occur.
Distribute the results to the public
Once the experiment has been completed, the results must be translated and shared
with the public as well as the scientific community. Again, these results must be
considered unbiased by all parties if the integrity of the project is to hold.
Seek feedback on the process
After the experiment has been formally completed and the results have been dis-
tributed, the scientists should seek feedback from the public. This is especially im-
portant if there is the potential for future research. If so, the feedback can serve as
an iterative step in the process toward the next experiment.
6.5 Maintain management flexibility capable of
working with change and the relevant interest
groups
As was seen in the deep-sea drilling research, a strong, flexible leadership can sustain a
project. The managers of the project must not only be able to have a solid foundation
in the science of the experiment, but they must also be representatives for their
research to the public and relevant government agencies.
Strong and adept project representation
The representatives of the project should be able to clearly state their position and
be willing to listen to the concerns of the public. Scientists that cannot cope with
public debate should not be put forward as representatives of the project.
Separate the layers of debate
It is usually the case that in policy/value decisions involving scientific uncertainties,
the scientific problem is much less important than the policy problem. 246 It is im-
portant then to ensure that the agencies responsible for deciding whether to allow
a certain project to exist separate the two levels of debate: one scientific, the other
political.
The CO 2 sequestration project is currently controversial at the political, value-
driven level and less so at the scientific level. The principal scientists need to ensure
that their experiment is judged at the scientific level by permitting authorities. If
the experiment becomes embroiled in a dispute over whether the information should
even be sought, the scientists will have lost control over their experiment.
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Flexibility in project goals - for long-term projects
It should be understood that the knowledge base changes over time, as do the political
and funding climates. If a project is to continue over long periods of time (> 5years)
then the management of the project must be aware of these changes and adjust the
project goals to accommodate them. This is not to say that the research must always
follow the latest scientific fads, but that it must not continue operating in a specific
manner just because that is the way it has always been done.
Appendix A
Legislation relevant to marine
scientific experimentation
Year Common name of legislation
(United States Code source)
1969 National Environmental Policy Act
(42 U.S.C. §4321-4370)
1972 Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
(33 U.S.C. §1441-1445)
1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Prevention and Control Act
Application
Requirements
general environment
Environmental Impact Statement
marine research (Title III)
'consistent' science
pollution (Title II)
permit
pollution
permit
(33 U.S.C. §1251-1387)
1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act
(16 U.S.C. §1361-1421)
species protection
scientific permit
Year Common name of legislation
(United States Code source)
1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter
1973 Endangered Species Act
(16 U.S.C. §1531-1544)
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Application
Requirements
pollution (ship-based)
permit
species protection
scientific permit
marine research (Part XIII)
pollution (Part XII)
'consistent' science
Note that 'consistent' science is defined as research that is consistent with the other
provisions of the legislation.
Appendix B
Acronyms and abbreviations used
AMSOC American Miscellaneous Society
ATOC Acoustic Thermometry of Ocean Climate
CWA Clean Water Act
CZMA Coastal Zone Management Act
DSDP Deep Sea Drilling Project
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ESA Endangered Species Act
FWS Fish and Wildlife Service
HIFT Heard Island Feasibility Test
IODP Integrated Ocean Drilling Program
JOI Joint Oceanographic Institutions, Inc.
JOIDES Joint Oceanographic Institutions for Deep Earth Sampling
LDC London Dumping Convention
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MMC Marine Mammal Commission
MMPA Marine Mammal Protection Act
MMRP Marine Mammal Research Program
MPRSA Marine Protection, Resources, and Sanctuaries Act
NEHLA Natural Energy Laboratory of Hawaii Authority
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NRC National Research Council
NSF National Science Foundation
ODP Ocean Drilling Program
ONR Office of Naval Research
PICHTR Pacific International Center for High Technology Research
SERDP Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program
SIO Scripps Institution of Oceanography
SOFAR SOund Fixing And Ranging
TAMU Texas A & M University
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
WHOI Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
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